AsiaBarometer's Achievements, Underutilized Areas of the Survey Materials, and Future Prospects [1]

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Introduction

The AsiaBarometer is the most comprehensive comparative public opinion survey ever conducted in Asia, which covers East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia.[2] The AsiaBarometer has achieved a task which had never been undertaken before and would not be feasible in the near future had the project not started, which is to carry out national sample surveys in the entire continent of Asia for a period of six years. The AsiaBarometer distinguishes itself from other survey projects in two important respects: (1) it covers the entire Asian continent, that is 31 countries except from Timor-leste and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; (2) it focuses on daily lives of ordinary Asian peoples and peoples of three adjacent countries: Russia, Australia, and the United States. The AsiaBarometer might be as well called an Asian "quality of life" survey.

Asia is a huge continent of enormous dynamism and diversity, which is evident in its geographic, cultural, economic, political, linguistic and other dimensions. In geographical terms, the continent may be divided into East Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, Brunei), South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, the Maldives and Afghanistan), and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Mongolia). In cultural terms, Asia is home to five major civilizations: Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. In political terms, many types of political regimes coexist in the region. If the categories used in the 2011 Democracy Index as developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit[3] are applied to characterize the continent's political systems, then it turns out that the AsiaBarometer covers four full democracies (Japan, South Korea, Australia and the United States), eight flawed democracies (Taiwan, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Indonesia, Mongolia, Malaysia and the Philippines), and eight hybrid regimes (Hong Kong, Singapore, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Bhutan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Nepal) and 10 authoritarian regimes (Russia, Kazakhstan, China, Vietnam, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Laos, Myanmar, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). From the economic point of view, we cover high income countries like Japan, Singapore and Brunei, and low income countries like Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Tajikistan. 35 languages are used to carry out the AsiaBarometer, ands the survey has run every year between 2003 and 2008 with a different Asian subregion covered each year.

What Has Been Accomplished

The principal objective of the AsiaBarometer is to examine the quality of life in Asia. To pursue that objective, we have used face-to-face interviews throughout the continent.

In order to describe and explain daily lives of ordinary people as embedded in a wider society, questions pertaining to such subjects as personal health, interpersonal trust and confidence in social institutions, political orientations and international relations. Inclusion of such auxiliary questions enables a researcher to make sense of the quality of life in Asia's immensely diverse social settings. This objective has been accomplished by the AsiaBarometer. The subsequent description of its accomplishments is divided into three categories: methodological, theoretical and substantive.

Methodologically, the fact that the surveys were conducted in 29 Asian countries (plus Hong Kong) and in three Western countries for a period of six years allowed for as many as four different types of comparative analyses. These analyses included comparisons within each sub-region of Asia, between sub-regions, between Asian and Western countries, and within each Asian country over time. Because our focus was on daily lives of ordinary people in Asia, we have been able to execute surveys of a normal kind, i.e. nation-wide random sample surveys, even though authoritarian regimes, hybrid regimes and flawed democracies amount to 27 political systems in Asia. Yet, we have been able to carry out surveys in all of 27 non-democratic Asian countries because our principle has been to accommodate a regime's deletion of certain kinds of questions with simultaneous retention of the rest of the questionnaire. In not a single country has been our request to conduct AsiaBarometer rejected. Still, we did not ask authorities in Timor-leste and North Korea to let us carry out the AsiaBarometer. North Korea is known for rejection of such requests in principle. Timore-leste was judged to be risky for internal volatility reasons in 2002 when we considered to carry out the survey there. The fact that the AsiaBarometer has been successfully executed in such a large number of countries, including in authoritarian regimes, represents a strategic victory of the project achieved at the time when Asia was changing rapidly and in a very complex manner. If the AsiaBarometer covered only full democracies and a few flawed ones, the dynamics of Asia's democratization could not be fully captured by the project. To achieve that task, AsiaBarometer had to survey also politically volatile countries such as Thailand, Myanmar and Nepal. As a matter of fact, we were able to analyze the Thailand's democratization process with two surveys, one conducted before and the other after the country's military coup of 2006.[4]

From the theoretical perspective, these comparisons enabled us to test a variety of theories, including those of modernization, globalization, the clash of civilizations and the Asian values hypotheses. Building on individual responses to the quality of life questions, Inoguchi/Fujii[5] have proposed to divide Asian societies into a few types depending on their characterization in terms of the degree of materialism, post-materialism and public sphere dominance. The position of societies categorized within these dimension was subsequently fruitfully compared to their categorization within regime type classification provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit. One may ask at this point why we have used for our purposes the EIU classification instead of the more commonly applied regime type classifications in political science, which are Freedom House and/or Polity? The reason is that EIU political system classification criteria are more sensitive to the Asia's enormous diversity and its ongoing rapid transformation. As far as political activism in daily life is treated as an aspect of democratic participation, our results suggest that globalization enhances democracy. Turning to the clash of civilizations hypothesis, Inoguchi/Collet[6] argued after analyzing public opinion trends that its plausibility may have been reduced as a result of the increasing tide of globalization. In this context, the clash of values which takes place within each society becomes more pronounced than the cross-national value conflicts.[7]

Substantively, the AsiaBarometer has focused on the perceived quality of life among Asians. The most notable findings on the quality of life data include the following three 1) High economic achievers and highly democratic citizens of Japanese, South Koreans and Taiwanese are the least happy in Asia and in the world whereas the lowest income getting societies of South Asia are the happiest in Asia, suggesting the roles that religion and community play in reaching what John Stuart Mill calls the "happiness by the way"; 2) One might identify five societal patterns in Asia, with their qualities exhibiting certain mixes of materialism (survival), post-materialism (social relations) and public sphere (state dominance). Here materialism means survival-driven lifestyle, post-materialism means social relations-driven lifestyle and public sphere dominance means the lifestyle strongly constrained by the state's imposition and regulation; 3) Deeply rooted in the aspects of social relations pertaining to the quality of life, interpersonal trust and confidence in social institutions are complex phenomena to gauge and assess. Empirical examinations of trust and confidence suggest that these phenomena could be to a large extent explained by broad, historically shaped and accumulated patterns of political culture, such as belief in human nature preached in Confucianism and Hinduism, individual utilitarian calculus bred under British colonialism, and compliance with social system which emerged under communist regimes.[8]

Underutilized Data

First, one should mention the policy priority expressed by citizens in 29 countries as to which policy area one should give first priority to, especially pension and defense. The hypothesis named “geriatric peace” by Mark Haas is being tested. By geriatric peace we mean that as the aged population increases and enhances its political voice, it starts to prioritize government spending on pensions rather than on defense. The testing of the geriatric peace hypothesis points to the need to develop more meaningful indicators tapping such socioeconomic characteristics as income, education and occupation, and the cultural characteristics of language and religion. In most Asian countries except for South Asia the long-term demographic trend of aging has already been examined. Inoguchi and Fujii empirically test the geriatric peace hypothesis country by country in Asia. The overall result seems to point to the correctness of the hypothesis. However, whether these preferences are translated and legislated into government action needs further research. The distributive dimension of life qualities needs to be analyzed systematically in order to address the increasingly controversial issue of equality and justice. [9]

Second, analyzing responses to interpersonal trust questions by the Chinese and Japanese, I have been developing a hypothesis about what these two national groups have in mind when asked about interpersonal trust with the question, "Do you think that people can be trusted or one cannot be too careful about other persons?" Chinese seem to have in mind primarily their family, thus receiving a higher figure of trust whereas Japanese seem to have in mind primarily unfamiliar persons outside the family, thus producing a lower figure of trust. But this is still an area where the data remains to be fully explored.

Third, multi-linguage surveys pose a serious question of linguistic sameness. The AsiaBarometer uses English for the master questionnaire and then translates it into 35 languages. Part of the difficulties arising in the process is due to the peculiarity of the English language. A good example is a sentence “one cannot be too careful in dealing with people”. This sentence represents two components, cannot and too, which

may not be easily and accurately rendered to some local languages in one sentence. How can one assure that one's translation of this sentence into Tamil or Burmese is correct and similarly nuanced? Another example is the range of choices available when one needs to choose one of the five options: very positive, positive, neutral, negative or very negative regarding questions like: "overall do you trust other persons?" Many Japanese respondents tend to choose neutral or at least neither very positive nor very negative especially when the context of a question is not sufficiently specified. This phenomenon makes the task of assuring cross-national linguistic sameness more difficult. To this question I do not see any pragmatic, but only disciplined answer.

Future Prospects

The AsiaBarometer has produced a substantial body of research. Most immediately forthcoming is the massive volume entitled *The Mirror That Reflects the Minds of Asian People*. One volume of approximately 1500 printed pages, this book collects many articles analyzing AsiaBarometer survey data, published in reputed journals on the quality of life. Three other books that use the AsiaBarometer data have been published on the topic.[10] Reflecting on the AsiaBarometer's products, one first of all needs to address the agenda which concerns the need to consolidate infrastructure for this kind of empirical social science projects, which require large scale data processing, analysis and storage.[11]

First, in the phase two, surveys will need to be conducted every year with a regular set of questions asked for every country and another set of questions asked for subregions in order to acquire more localized, contextualized and nuanced data.

Second, infrastructure building is slow but steady. Unlike the European Union-funded or sponsored polling and academic institutions, Asian institutions do not coordinate very much. Yet, one positive and encouraging sign in this regard is the steady increase in the number of academic institutions collaborating with one another. The AsiaBarometer is a very good example of such a practice. Whenever the AsiaBarometer decides to execute surveys in a country X, it is expected that locally residing academics are sought after to analyze the data, write a country profile and analyze relevant subjects. A recently conducted survey of AsiaBarometer users worldwide has revealed the need to execute AsiaBarometer regularly, say every year, and more widely. This is a challenging call.

Third, the national and global sampling methodology needs to be discussed and improved. By national sampling I mean a normal way of handling surveys using the national unit as given and comparing the national or sub-group averages. These are called cross-national surveys. By global sampling I mean a process through which global population is divided into numerous sampling blocs with similar population. Thus if one carries out a survey in the ASEAN member countries, their population size vis-a-vis the entire global population determines the number of sampled respondents. Instead of using the same amount of money for Brunei (population of approximately 300,000) and Indonesia (population of close to 300 millions), for instance, the global sampling can execute surveys with smaller costs and similar scientific credentials.

To encourage the hope for the future regarding the aforementioned two points, I would like to propose to establish an international journal of social research. While US-edited journals are "autocentric" in a sense that their own competitive dynamics often semi-automatically rejects submissions from outside, and while European solidarity of poll organization with pooled resources is admirable, one may ponder about publishing a

journal of social research attuned to grasp and analyze more localized, contextualized and nuanced social behavior.

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1 I am grateful to Doh Chull Shin, Staffan I. Lindberg, and the Editorial Board of the APSA CD Newsletter for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.

2 Takashi Inoguchi, "Demographic Change and Asian Dynamics: Social and Political Implications," *Asian Economic Policy Review* 4 (June 2009): 142-157; and Takashi Inoguchi and Seiji Fujii, *The Quality of Life in Asia: A Comparison of The Quality of Life in 29 Asian Countries and Societies* (Amsterdam: Springer, 2012), forthcoming.

3 Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2011* (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012).

4 Satoru Mikami and Takashi Inoguchi, "Legitimacy and Effectiveness in Thailand, 2003-2007: Perceived Quality of Governance and Its Consequences on Political Beliefs," *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* 8 (September 2008): 279-302.

5 Inoguchi and Fuji, *The Quality of Life in Asia.*

6 Christian Collet and Takashi Inoguchi, "Is Globalization Undermining the Clash of Civilizations? A Test of Huntington among the Publics of Greater Asia and the Pacific," *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 13 (2012), forthcoming.

7 Takashi Inoguchi, "Clash of Values across Civilizations," in Russell Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 240-258.

8 Inoguchi and Fujii, *The Quality of Life in Asia.* and Takashi Inoguchi, "Social Capital in Ten Asian Societies," *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 5 (May 2004): 197-211.

9 Mark Haas, "A Geriatric Peace? The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations," *International Security* 32 (Summer 2007): 112-147; Doh Chull Shin and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., *The Quality of Life in Confucian Asia* (Amsterdam: Springer, 2010); and Inoguchi, Takashi and Seiji Fujii (forthcoming) *Geriatric Peace in Asia.*

10 Takashi, Inoguchi, ed., *The Mirror That Reflects the Minds of Asian People* (Tokyo: Nishimura shoten, 2012), forthcoming; and Inoguchi and Fuji, *The Quality of Life in Asia.* The books on this topic which use the AsiaBarometer data also include Inoguchi and Fujii (2010), and Shin and Inoguchi (2010).

11 Takashi Inoguchi (2001) "Research and Teaching Infrastructure: Social/Behavioral Sciences(East Asia and Pacific)," in Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes, eds., *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* 26 (2011): 7489-7493

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Is Globalization Undermining Civilizational Identities? A Test of Huntington's Core State Assumptions among the Publics of Greater Asia and the Pacific

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Abstract

Samuel Huntington's influential clash of civilizations hypothesis (Huntington, 1993; Huntington, 1996) has been widely debated, but empirical tests of his ideas about core states remain limited at the micro-level. In this paper, we bring new evidence to bear, focusing on the 'cauldron of civilizations': Greater Asia and the Pacific. Using the AsiaBarometer, we examine the extent to which publics in the region identify with the core states of the supposedly most contentious civilizations in the region – the US, China, and Iran – and the factors that influence those perceptions. We give attention to the role of globalization and nationalism and whether both may be subsumed by religiosity as Huntington suggests. Our descriptive evidence affirms some of the tensions between the US, China, and Islamic-predominant Asia identified by Huntington as areas of potential conflict. At the same time, we find no evidence to suggest that attitudes toward core states are zero-sum; Asian publics often see rival powers as mutually good influences. Using multivariate analysis, we find that religiosity, as the clash paradigm surmises, boosts Iranian influence and undermines American influence in several predominantly Islamic states. We also find, contrary to Huntington, that overall exposure to foreign cultures leads to a more positive assessment of American influence among Chinese and Pakistanis, as well as American perceptions

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of China. When foreign exposure influences perceptions of Iran, the effect is modestly, but consistently, negative. Taken together, the findings raise questions about two key assumptions of the Huntington framework – civilizational identity formation and cultural resurgence – and suggest that alternative approaches in recent civilizations literature show greater empirical promise.

1. Introduction

'It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural . . . The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future' (Huntington, 1993: 22). So began Samuel Huntington in one of the most provocative, cited, debated, and examined assertions in international affairs of the last two decades. Despite the voluminous critical discussion that the 'clash of civilizations' thesis has generated, and the civilizational dialogue it has helped to inspire, questions remain about whether there is an empirical basis for claims about the differences between cultures and whether such an approach to world politics, in the face of modernity, is warranted. Huntington's main contention – that strengthened religious identities, revived traditions, and irreconcilable values will define post-Cold War conflict – has yielded a wave of assessments. His notion that such conflicts are built around civilizational identities at 'the micro level' through growing cultural affiliation with core states has not.

Our purpose is to address this gap. We ask two questions. First, to what extent do publics show culturally based affinities toward core states? And, second, is religiosity a driving factor behind these affinities, as Huntington suggests, or does nationalism and globalization mitigate its impact? The answers to both are important insofar as affirmative evidence may not only suggest a basis for a civilizational consciousness through the discernment of 'friend' and 'foe', but may suggest that globalization is having the boomeranging, or 'culturally resurgent', effect upon which the clash model rests.

Our focus is on attitudes in what Huntington refers to as the 'cauldron of civilizations': the Asian Pacific. A region suffering from undercoverage in other analyses of Huntington's assertions, Asia is home to three in every five of the world's citizens, six of the ten most spoken languages, and seven of the world's nine civilizations (as defined under his framework). The analysis that follows, based on surveys in 28 Asian societies, including Russia and the United States, is therefore well positioned to address the two questions Huntington raises.

2. The debate continues

With a citation count in excess of 10,700 in Google Scholar as of July 2012 (and more than 17,000 if one includes its 1993 precursor in *Foreign Affairs*), *The Clash of Civilizations* continues to stimulate debate, particularly in light of the 9/11 attacks

and America's incursions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. A full consideration of this vast, interdisciplinary literature – as well as the numerous popular critiques – is well beyond the scope of this paper. Broadly speaking, the scholarly discussion has proceeded on two fronts. The conceptual debate centers on the use of civilizations as units for a post-Cold War framework for world politics. The empirical/evidentiary discussion, which has grown out of and, in turn, shaped the conceptual debate, focuses on Huntington's expectations for conflict – and the evidence yielded by an assortment of quantitative tests.

Simplified, Huntington's theory rests on three assertions. The first is that conflict between states, once predicated on Cold War bipolarity, is giving way to conflict predicated on religious differences. Huntington envisions these as 'fault line' encounters that are primarily 'local wars between local groups with wider (1996: 268) connections'. The second assertion follows: such 'wider connections' are facilitated by core states (e.g., the United States, China) who, in essence, act as representatives of their respective civilizations (e.g., Western, Sinic). Core states are crucial because they are 'viewed by their members as the principle source . . . of the civilizations culture' (135) and 'like older members of a family . . . provide relatives with both support and discipline' (156). They rarely engage in conflict themselves, but structure a multicivilizational world by dominating member states at the macro-level and serving as beacons at the micro-level that 'attract those who are culturally similar and repel[ling] those who are culturally different' (155). Core states are thus central to a civilizations-based politics because, on the ground, they promote and reinforce civilizational identities.

The third assertion is that globalization strengthens the power of core states as loci of civilizational identity because it produces a 'resurgence' of tradition and religiosity. Arguing against notions of modernization as a Westernizing or homogenizing force, Huntington contends that it instead

> promotes de-Westernization and the resurgence of indigenous cultures in two ways. At the societal level, modernization enhances the economic, military, and political power of the society as a whole and encourages the people of that society to have confidence in their culture and to become culturally assertive. At the individual level, modernization generates feelings of alienation and anomie, as traditional bonds and social relations are broken, and leads to crises of identity to which religion provides an answer (Huntington, 1996: 76).

How does globalization strengthen civilizational alignment? 'In today's world', Huntington contends, 'improvements in transportation and communication have produced more frequent, more intense, more symmetrical and more inclusive interactions among people of different civilizations. As a result their civilizational identities become increasingly salient . . . These broader levels of civilizational identity mean deeper consciousness of civilizational differences and of the need to protect what distinguishes "us" from "them"' (1996: 129) (Figure 1).

Where an armada of critics have taken exception to Huntington's 'essentialism' (see Hall and Jackson, 2007), categorization scheme, for modeling civilizations as



Figure 1. Simplified Huntington Theory of Core State Role in Civilizational Identity Formation

regional über-states and for exaggerating the likelihood of war between 'the West', 'Islam', and 'Confucian' societies (summarized nicely by Fox, 2005), his notions about the role of globalization and core states in the formation of a new (or renewed) regional identity have been subject to less scrutiny. Amartya Sen makes the case that 'the most limiting feature of the civilizational approach . . . [is] the mind-boggling shortcut is taken in trying to understand our sense of identity' which 'puts each of us into a little box of a single sense of belonging, to wit, our alleged perception of oneness with our respective "civilization"' (2008: 6). But this is to merely restate the conventional belief in the social sciences that identities are multifarious, fluid, situational, strategic as well as constructed (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2000); it does not account for the formation and salience, as has been widely examined in Europe, of transnational political identities rooted in religiosity and the perceived threat of 'foreign' cultures (Nelsen *et al.*, 2001; McLaren, 2002). It may be, as Steven Walt (1997) argues, that 'the neglect of nationalism' is instead the 'Achilles heel of the civilizational paradigm' as it has often been for Europeanization (e.g., Carey, 2002), and, as Henderson and Tucker (2001: 333) contend, 'the nation, and not the civilization, appears to be the largest identity group to which people consistently swear fealty in the post- Cold War era'. But that, too, remains debatable for, in a number of developing countries, as well as the US, surveys show individuals saying their religious identity is comparable to, or precedes, their national identity (e.g., Pew, 2011; Sinnott (2006) examines this in Asia). Huntington, in fairness, does not entirely dismiss nationalism, but subordinates it to his independent variable of particular interest, religiosity, contending that the fusion of the two mobilizes civilizational consciousness. Civilizational identities may be underspecified (Senghaas, 1998) and, as Sen claims, 'solitarist' in Huntington's model, but this neither renders them inconceivable (see Hall and Jackson, 2007) nor incompatible with either the state (e.g., Wendt, 1994) or nationalism (e.g., Duara, 2001).

Those who embrace the potential of civilizations as political units, and credit Huntington for raising their profile in international relations, have had little to say about the role of core states, appearing at times to take the formation of civilizational identities for granted[1]. Katzenstein (2010: 7) concedes that 'under specific conditions, political

[1] An exception is Jackson (2010).

coalitions and intellectual currents can create primordial civilizational categories' but contends that the dynamic of intercivilizational interaction is one of peaceful exchange, not conflict. This middle-ground position, which credits Huntington but places civilizations as 'malleable' 'weakly institutionalized social orders' shaped by contemporary 'technological orders' reflects two influences: Eisenstadt's (2001) ideas about 'modernity as a distinct civilization' and the empirical strand in the literature where the body of evidence has, in Katzenstein's phrasing, become 'so damaging [to the primary clash hypothesis] that by now it must be considered to be factually wrong' (2010: 8). The predominant finding in several of these studies indeed appears devastating – 'clashes' have historically occurred *within*, rather than *between*, civilizations (Russett *et al.*, 2000; Henderson and Tucker, 2001; Henderson, 2005; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006) and intercivilizational conflict, when it does appear, is less likely to escalate into war (Tusicisny, 2004). But other findings are nuanced: modernization itself may be facilitative of conflict (Chiozza, 2002); states from similar cultures tend to join the same international organizations (Beckfield, 2008); the West's greater likelihood of engaging in conflict appears due to its tendency to act collectively, like a civilization (Ellis, 2010; Charron, 2010); that cross-cultural and religious conflict has generally been on the rise (Fox, 2004, 2007; Roeder, 2003). Huntington, therefore, may poorly explain the past, but enough evidence has emerged to keep his ideas alive as observers anticipate alignments and conflicts of the future, particularly those that may involve 'The West' and 'Islam'. 'I still harbor doubts about whether the radical Islamists knocking at the gates of Europe . . . are the bearers of a whole civilization', initial critic Fouad Ajami (2008) writes. But 'clearly, commerce has not delivered us out of history's passions [and] the World Wide Web has not cast aside blood and kin and faith'.

It is reflections like these, along with a persistent media narrative (Seib, 2004), that has helped keep the clash discussion alive even as Huntington's third assertion – about globalization-induced resurgence at the micro-level – has remained secondary to the empirical discussion. Exceptional are papers dealing with European and Islamic publics, including a series of analyses based on the World Values Survey. In contrast to the aggregate level studies, the findings are generally sympathetic to Huntington, particularly in demonstrating cohesion among Islamic values and contrasts with the West. Inglehart and Christian Welzel contend that the Huntington-inspired boundaries in their 'cultural map of the world' (based on two dimensions of factor scores in the WVS) manifest 'real' differences, arguing that 'societies with a common cultural heritage *do* fall into common clusters' (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 66, emphasis original) (recalling Huntington's own notion that civilizations are 'meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real')[2]. Inglehart and

[2] The zones have been criticized for superimposing Huntington's debatable civilizational map layer, along the lines of several others who challenge Huntington's categorization scheme (Bonikowski 2010; Haller 2002).

Pippa Norris find further that Islamic publics show stronger affinities for religious leadership than do Western publics and that cleavages exist on social dimensions, such as gender and sexual equality – what they term the 'true clash of civilizations' (Norris and Inglehart, 2002; Inglehart and Norris, 2003 see also Esmer, 2002). They point out that the cultural differences involve 'Eros far more than Demos': once development and socioeconomic diversity are controlled, Islamic publics show stronger support for democratic ideals than those in Western states. But where this poses a challenge to the political aspects of the 'clash' hypothesis, it does little to alter Huntington's substantive conclusion: what remains an outlier in the world are the egalitarian and libertarian values of the West. Marsh (2009), also drawing upon the WVS, finds that the effects of Huntington's civilizational categories on values (relative to the West) are, in fact, larger than those produced by individual level variables.

As the West's core state, perceptions of the United States would presumably be important in defining civilizational identities. Yet, despite several comparative studies after 9/11, few cultural patterns have been revealed in this regard, for the anti-Americanism that emerged after the Iraq invasion was felt at least as deeply in parts of Western Europe as in the Middle East. Chiozza (2009) finds, in fact, that foreign views of the US are structured similarly across different cultural zones, although Europeans tend to be more critical of policy where attitudes toward the American people and president combine to shape the impressions of Islamic publics. Studies of foreign opinion toward other core states are scarce, although comparative surveys generally point to intercivilizational heterogeneity (Esmer, 2002; Diez-Nicolas, 2003), within 'Islam' (e.g., Acevedo, 2008; Rose, 2002; Furia and Lucas, 2006) as well as 'Confucian' societies (Dalton and Ong, 2005; Kim, 2010; Park, 2011). The question that remains, as far as Huntington is concerned, is whether the presumed core states outside the West are capable of generating similar affinities and enmities as the US and, with particular regard to the theoretical question of civilizational identity, whether such attitudes may be culturally rooted and enduring.

3. Hypotheses

As such, we expect that:

H1 In-civilization (member state) publics will affiliate more strongly with the core state of their civilization than out-civilization publics.

Hence, Western-influenced publics will be more inclined than others in Asia to view the US as a positive influence and Sinic publics will be more inclined than others, *ceteris paribus*, to view China as a positive influence. Where the lack of a core Islamic state makes affiliation an open question, it would follow that

H1a Citizens in predominantly Islamic states in Asia will identify more closely with Iran and be more inclined to see it as a positive influence than those in Sinic or Western-influenced civilizations.

Where Huntington's emphasis is on religions and their differing values, he makes multiple references in his book to the 'revitalization of religion' as a factor that 'reinforces' cultural differences and civilizational identities. Extending this, it would seem reasonable to suppose that perceptions of core states, if civilizationally derived, would be influenced by the degree of commitment to one's religion. This is presumably because those most committed to their religion would be more likely to perceive threats to their values and see core states as potential bulwarks capable of preserving the integrity of those values (Ellingsen, 2005). Hence, we expect that

H2 As religiosity within given member state publics increases, perceptions of in-civilization core states will improve and perceptions of out-civilization core states, ceteris paribus, *will decline.*

H3 As nationalism within given member state publics increases, perceptions of in-civilization core states will increase and perceptions of out-civilization core states, ceteris paribus, will decrease.

Finally, to address the expected impact of globalization, we hypothesize that

H4 As exposure to foreign cultures within given member state publics increases, perceptions of in-civilization core states will increase and perceptions of out-civilization core states, ceteris paribus, will decrease.

4. Data and findings

To test these hypotheses, we employ data from the AsiaBarometer, pooled from the project's four waves in 2005 and 2008. In 2005, the predominantly Islamic states of the former Soviet Union (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) were surveyed along with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. In 2006, Japan, China, and South Korea were included along with Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand were in the 2007 wave, while the 2008 wave again included China, India, and Japan, but expanded to cover Australia, Russia, and the United States.

Taken together, the pooled dataset includes the attitudes of 11 predominantly Islamic societies; seven Buddhist societies, five Sinic societies, and four Western societies, along with India and Nepal among predominantly Hindu societies, Russia representing Orthodoxy and Japan – a mixture of seven of Huntington's civilizations (Table 1). This yields a total of 15 intracivilizational and 61 intercivilizational dyads

Table 1. *Country coverage of AsiaBarometer and civilizational grouping, per Huntington (1996, 26–7)*

				N	% ID Muslim in Sample
Buddhist	Bhutan	BT	2005	801	1.4
	Cambodia	KH	2007	1012	0.2
	Laos	LA	2007	1000	0
	Mongolia	MN	2005	800	2
	Sri Lanka	LK	2005	813	19.9
	Thailand	TH	2007	1000	1.7
Hindu	India	IN	2005	1238	2.8
	India	IN	2008	1.05	4.2
	Nepal	NP	2005	800	0.8
Islamic	Afghanistan	AF	2005	874	99.8
	Bangladesh	BD	2005	1008	85.5
	Indonesia	ID	2007	1000	91.9
	Kazakhstan	KZ	2005	800	31.9
	Kyrgyzstan	KG	2005	800	76.4
	Malaysia	MY	2007	1000	62.7
	Maldives	MV	2005	821	NA
	Pakistan	PK	2005	1086	97.7
	Tajikistan	TJ	2005	800	96.6
	Turkmenistan	TM	2005	800	95
	Uzbekistan	UZ	2005	800	71.5
Japanese	Japan	JP	2006	1003	0
	Japan	JP	2008	1012	0
Orthodox	Russia	RU	2008	1055	6.6
Sinic	China	CN	2006	2000	0.7
	China	CN	2008	1000	2
	Singapore	SG	2006	1038	21.4
	South Korea	KR	2006	1023	0
	Taiwan	TW	2006	1006	0
	Vietnam	VN	2006	1000	0
Western	Australia	AU	2008	1000	2.5
	Hong Kong	HK	2006	1000	0.1
	Philippines	PH	2007	1000	1
	United States	US	2008	1002	0.7

for analysis. The surveys were administered face-to-face in the country's predominant languages, using stratified, multistage random sampling to determine household and respondent eligibility. In some developing countries, the sampling frame was biased toward urban centers and quotas were set to meet the age and gender profile of the country as indicated in its national census.

The value of using the AsiaBarometer to test Huntington's core state assertions lies not only in its wide coverage of Asian publics, but in its offering of appropriate measures (described below), including several that differ from those used in papers based on the

WVS. Yet, like the WVS and other large-scale comparative survey projects, the data face limitations in terms of cross-cultural/national measurement equivalence, translation and comprehension (Stegmueller, 2011). Minato (2008), in a review, notes further that the delicacy of political questions in the AsiaBarometer may have introduced biases and inconsistencies across contexts, particularly those where respondents live under authoritarian regimes. The reader is thus cautioned that data collected under such circumstances may be susceptible to additional error and that, due to the need to obtain approval from authorities to execute the project in some societies, that all standard political items from the AsiaBarometer questionnaire may not have been asked in all countries. In such instances, where our model could not be tested, countries were dropped after the descriptive analysis. The reader is cautioned further that the single year studies in several countries may have introduced idiosyncratic, cross-sectional effects endemic to the year of data collection. Additional methodological caveats and limitations concerning specific in-country data collection efforts, along with complete fieldwork reports, can be obtained at https://www.asiabarometer.org/en/surveys by clicking on the appropriate survey year.

4.1. Dependent variable

The dependent variable, core state influence, is an item that asks, 'Do you think the following countries have a good influence or a bad influence on your country?' It is an appropriate measure for the study because the use of 'influence' represents an effort to tap into deeper cultural affinities and economic values that go beyond current events, leaders or diplomatic relationships of-the-moment (though, of course, the item may capture some of these feelings as well). China and the United States were tested in all four waves; Iran in 2005 and 2006. Respondents were asked to assess influence on a 5-point ordinal scale, ranging from 'bad influence' to 'good influence', with a neutral option 'neither good nor bad influence' in the middle.

Table 2 displays the descriptives. Attitudes toward US influence vary more widely than those concerning Chinese or Iranian influence. Where Cambodians and Filipinos appear to be among the most favorable toward American power in Asia, Russians have the least favorable impressions. Views among Islamic publics, on the whole, lean toward neutrality; the negative opinions of Malaysians and Indonesians appear to be offset by the positive opinions of Afghans and Tajiks. Chinese view American influence as mostly 'bad'; Australians and Japanese appear ambivalent. Indians see US power as something generally 'good' for India.

Chinese influence is viewed most negatively by Mongolians and Japanese; Americans and Taiwanese are also inclined to see it as 'bad'. Russians and Australians have neutral opinions. Chinese power is, on the whole, perceived more favorably in Islamic Asia than among the other publics of the Sinic civilization, where South Korea and Vietnam retain substantial negative/neutral views. Pakistanis and Afghans are among those who are most consistently positive about Chinese influence.

Table 2. *Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, US, Chinese and Iranian influence (5 point re-scale: 1 = 'Bad', 5 = 'Good'), by country and civilization grouping*

		US			CN			IR		
	N	Mean	SD	SE	Mean	SD	SE	Mean	SD	SE
Buddhist										
BT	801	3.64	0.88	0.03	3.01	1.03	0.04	3.01	0.51	0.02
KH	1012	4.35	0.82	0.03	3.59	0.92	0.03			
LA	1000	3.34	1.05	0.03	4.05	0.90	0.03			
MN	800	3.68	0.83	0.03	2.36	1.11	0.04	2.95	0.48	0.02
LK	813	3.28	1.14	0.04	4.04	0.83	0.03	3.09	0.57	0.02
TH	1000	3.65	0.89	0.03	3.74	0.76	0.02			
Hindu										
IN	2290	3.61	1.03	0.02	3.37	1.03	0.02	3.17	0.89	0.03
NP	800	3.61	0.84	0.03	3.93	0.72	0.03	3.00	0.35	0.01
Islamic										
AF	874	4.35	0.92	0.03	4.30	0.75	0.03	3.81	1.07	0.04
BD	1008	3.19	1.11	0.03	3.98	0.85	0.03	3.40	0.81	0.03
ID	1000	2.56	1.19	0.04	3.26	1.00	0.03			
KZ	800	2.77	0.98	0.03	3.08	1.00	0.04	2.72	0.84	0.03
KG	800	3.05	1.16	0.04	3.07	1.19	0.04	2.94	0.74	0.03
MY	1000	2.63	1.18	0.04	3.73	0.76	0.02			
MV	821	3.35	1.27	0.04	3.57	1.21	0.04	3.20	0.93	0.03
PK	1086	2.81	1.12	0.03	4.30	0.82	0.02	3.81	0.86	0.03
TJ	800	3.55	1.06	0.04	3.86	1.01	0.04	4.16	0.81	0.03
TM	800	3.42	1.08	0.04	3.54	0.81	0.03	3.14	0.98	0.03
UZ	800	2.88	1.17	0.04	3.29	1.10	0.04	2.87	0.84	0.03
Japan	2015	3.11	0.94	0.02	2.62	0.91	0.02	2.50	0.78	0.02
Russia	1055	2.39	0.95	0.03	2.99	0.82	0.03			
Sinic										
CN	3000	2.70	1.00	0.02				3.12	0.60	0.01
SG	1038	3.78	0.90	0.03	3.76	0.87	0.03	2.71	0.81	0.03
KR	1023	3.18	1.04	0.03	3.09	0.91	0.03	2.74	0.66	0.02
TW	1006	3.69	0.83	0.03	2.90	1.01	0.03	2.75	0.69	0.02
VN	1000	3.33	0.97	0.03	3.3	0.96	0.03	2.79	0.63	0.02
Western										
AU	1000	2.96	1.05	0.03	3.07	0.88	0.03			
HK	1000	3.20	0.82	0.03	3.64	0.79	0.02	2.58	0.66	0.02
PH	1000	4.22	0.78	0.02	3.47	1.01	0.03			
US	1002				2.83	0.92	0.03			

The positive feelings that emerge in Islamic Asia toward China are not reciprocated – at least as far as Iran is concerned, toward whom the Chinese appear to have neutral impressions. Yet Chinese opinions of Iranian influence are more positive than others in their immediate neighborhood, particularly Hong Kong and Singapore. Iran's power is viewed most favorably, as we expected, among predominantly Islamic



Figure 2. Scatterplots of Country-level Mean Perceptions

publics like Tajikistan and Pakistan. Kazakhs and Uzbekis, at the same time, appear to be more critical.

4.1.1. Core state perceptions: are they zero-sum?. Figure 2 plots the means from Table 2 against one another in an effort to examine whether public perceptions of core states may be related, particularly in a negative way. If Huntington's assumptions about core states have some empirical basis, we would expect to see publics engaged, in a zero-sum fashion – not only identifying with the core state of their civilizations, but viewing competitive core states adversely.

In none of these plots does such a pattern emerge. The only one that reaches a standard level of significance is when the perceptions of China are regressed on perceptions of Iran ($N = 20$, $b = 0.78$, $p < 0.01$, $\alpha = 0.22$, $Adj.R^2 = 0.38$). When the Asian Islamic states are isolated in the analysis, the amount of variance the simple model predicts in Chinese perceptions increases ($N = 9$, $Adj.R^2 = 0.68$).

4.2. Independent variables

There are three independent variables of interest in this analysis. The first, foreign exposure, is a 6-point additive index developed from a battery of items that asks whether:



Figure 3. Scatterplot of Nationalism x Religiosity, weighted by Level of Foreign Exposure

- A member of [Rs] family or a relative lives in another country.
- [R has] traveled abroad at least three times in the past three years, on holiday or for business purposes.
- [R] has foreign friends in his home country.
- [R] often watch[es] foreign-produced programs on TV.
- [R] often communicate[s] with people in other countries via the internet or email.
- [Rs] job involved contact with organizations or people in other countries.

The second, nationalism, is measured by asking whether R can 'recite the national anthem [of her/his country] by heart' (0 = no; 1 = yes). The third variable of interest, religiosity, also measures a practice. It asks the respondent 'How often do you pray or meditate?' (1 = never; 5 = every day). The country-level descriptives for the independent variables are presented in Appendix Table 1.

4.2.1. Exploring religiosity, nationalism and foreign exposure in the Asian Pacific. In Figure 3, we plot the means for each of the three variables of interest in a first effort to unravel the interplay of religion, nationalism, and foreign exposure in the Asian Pacific region.

Publics in the Sinic civilizational grouping (shown in lighter gray) are generally characterized by low religiosity and high levels of nationalism. China appears to be an outlying case and, as indicated by its small circle, reveals a low level of foreign exposure among its citizens. Generally, each of the countries in the upper left quadrant of the plot, which include Japan and Thailand, have lower levels of foreign exposure, making Singapore stand out for its apparent cosmopolitanism and moderate religiosity. Predominantly Islamic publics (in black) are more diverse. Where residents of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, like Russia, exhibit low levels of religious practice or national attachment, those in Maldives, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Bangladesh reveal high levels of both. Afghans appear to be strong worshippers and weak nationalists. Pakistanis lean toward faith over country. Uzbekis lie somewhere in the middle. Like Sinic publics, many Islamic citizens have little interaction with the world. The Singaporean exception for Asian Islam would be Maldives, followed in degree by Uzbekistan and Malaysia.

Figure 3 reveals something further about the publics of core states. Where China and Russia lie at opposite poles of nationalism, but are similarly low in terms of religiosity, Indians are high on both measures. Americans, who appear similar to the more globally engaged Buddhist publics and Singapore on these measures, are notably more nationalistic and religious than their Westernized counterparts in Australia. Filipinos appear to combine strong nationalism with faith, placing them alongside other Southeast Asian Islamic publics, like Indonesians and Malaysians, as well as Indians.

4.3. Model specification

At the individual level, we can specify a model where the probability of citizen$_i$, within a given country$_j$, will perceive the influence of core state$_k$

$$\Pr(\text{core state influence}_k = m \mid x_{ij} \;=\; F(\tau_m - x\beta) - F(\tau_{m-1} - x\beta)$$

will be explained by

$$x\beta = \beta_{1ij}\,(\text{civilization grouping})$$

as well as nationalism, and foreign exposure

$$\beta_{2ij}\,(\text{religiosity}) + \beta_{3ij}\,(\text{nationalism}) + \beta_{4ij}\,(\text{foreign exposure})$$

Controls include ordinal measures of standard of living ('How would you describe your standard of living?' (1 = low; 5 = high) and education (1 = low, 3 = high), as well as gender (1 = male) and age. Following Huntington, we anticipate potential interaction between religiosity and nationalism. Hence, a full model with a set of controls and the interaction term would look like

$$x\beta = \beta_{1ij}\,(\text{civilization grouping}) + \beta_{2ij}\,(\text{religiosity}) + \beta_{3ij}\,(\text{nationalism})$$



Figure 4. Percent Change in Odds of Seeing Core States as a "Good" Influence, by Civilization \ vis-a-vis the Reference Group (Islamic for the US, Western for China and Iran), with Other Factors Held at Their Means

$$+ \beta_{4ij}\,(\text{foreign exposure}) + \beta_{5ij}\,(\text{standard of living}) + \beta_{6ij}\,(\text{education})$$

$$+ \beta_{7ij}\,(\text{gender}) + \beta_{8ij}\,(\text{age}) + \beta_{9ij}\,(\text{nationalism*religiosity})$$

4.4. Core state affinities: is there a micro-level basis for a civilizational framework?

Figure 4 displays the effects of civilization grouping on the dependent variables with the other variables in the model held at their means. The bars represent, *ceteris paribus*, the odds of having a one standard deviation more positive view of the core state *vis-a-vis* the reference group (in each case, the reference group selected was identified as the Huntington-defined strongest potential adversary (1996, 245). Because China appears to be an outlier (and because Chinese respondents represent a disproportionately large slice of the pool), it was separated from the other Sinic countries.

The results are mixed. On the one hand, citizens of other Westernized societies in Asia are more likely than the reference group (Islamic) to show affinity for the US, but they are outpaced by Buddhist and Sinic countries outside of China. Russians and Chinese are, in fact, less likely than Islamic citizens to view the US as a 'good' influence. With regards to Chinese influence, other Sinic societies show no statistically significant difference from the reference group – Westernized societies. Rather, it is residents in predominantly Islamic countries that show the highest probability for admiring Chinese influence – twice as much, relatively speaking, as the next most admiring publics in

Buddhist countries. Japanese, rather than Western publics, appear to be least inclined toward seeing Chinese power in a 'good' sense.

In the case of Iran, the evidence is supportive. Citizens within the Islamic civilization grouping are 156% more likely to have a (one standard deviation) better view of Iran's influence than those in Westernized Asia. Among the other civilizations tested, Chinese, Hindu, and Buddhist publics are also more inclined than the contrast group to see Iranian influence favorably. Sinic countries are less distinguishable, but the difference still meets a standard level of significance ($p < 0.05$). As with their views of China, Japanese appear to be significantly less likely than the reference group to view the power of Iran favorably.

Separate ordered logit models were run in each country using each the three dependent variables. The complete results appear in Appendix Tables 2–7. The remainder of the analysis is devoted first to a general discussion of the variables of interest on each of the three core states, the US, China, and Iran, respectively, which is followed by a summary discussion.

4.5. Explaining core state influence: the United States

4.5.1. The effects of religiosity, nationalism and foreign exposure. Religiosity has complex effects on views of American power in the Asian Pacific. In China and Russia, religion interacts with nationalism. This indicates that the heightened perceptions of American influence generated by religiosity in these countries depresses as levels of nationalism increase. In Japan, religiosity lowers the probability of seeing the US as a 'good' influence. In Australia, it increases the same probability – consistent with what we would expect from a predominantly Christian public.

In eight of the 11 states in the Islamic grouping, religiosity has no direct impact on views of US influence. In Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan, the effect is in the expected negative direction. Among Malaysians, nationalism and religiosity appear to mutually depress perceptions of American influence. At the same time, nationalism boosts perceptions of US influence, as witnessed in the cases of Tajikistan and Laos.

Foreign exposure, *ceteris paribus*, improves perceptions of the United States in several societies across civilizational groupings. In Vietnam, its effect is significant at $p < 0.05$; in China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the z-score of the coefficient reaches a higher standard $p < 0.001$. Among Indonesians, foreign exposure has a reductive influence.

4.5.2. Controls: standard of living and education. Of the control factors included in our US model, two emerged as important: self-reported standard of living and education. Increases in living standard lead to positive perceptions of American influence among Russians, Singaporeans, and South Koreans as well as among non-Chinese Sinic countries as a whole. Among predominantly Islamic publics, higher standards of living raise attitudes toward the US in Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. They depress perceptions in Malaysia and Turkmenistan.

The role of education is less consistent. A higher level of education in China increases perceptions of US influence. In several Islamic states – Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, and Pakistan – the effect of higher education is, *ceteris paribus*, depressive on such attitudes.

4.6. Explaining core state influence: China

4.6.1. The effects of religiosity, nationalism, and foreign exposure. Religiosity, on the whole, appears to play a small role in shaping impressions of Chinese influence. In Singapore, Tajikistan, and Maldives, the effect is negative, meaning greater religious devotion in those publics is, *ceteris paribus*, likely to decrease the probability of seeing Chinese power in a positive light. In Bangladesh, however, the effect is positive.

The influence of nationalism is more apparent, appearing to influence views of China primarily in her immediate sphere of influence: Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Bhutan. In the case of Singapore, nationalism depresses views of Chinese influence; for the others, the effect is positive.

As with perceptions of American influence, attitudes toward Chinese influence increase in several Asian publics with greater levels of foreign exposure. Noteworthy are the boosts given by cultural interaction in American, Taiwanese, and Vietnamese contexts. Similar patterns are found among Afghans, Bangladeshis, Maldivians, and Turkmens. Indonesians again are an exception, showing lower likelihood of viewing Chinese power as 'good' as their exposure to foreign cultures increases.

4.6.2. Controls: standard of living and age. Perceptions of China, as observed in the American model, can be linked to increases in standard of living. This pattern is manifest in Russia, South Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan, and Indonesia.

A generational lens on perceptions of Chinese influence is evident in the data. In the American and Japanese samples, age is negative, indicating that Chinese influence is viewed more negatively as the respondent gets older. Education appears to have mixed influence. It has a reductive impact on the views of Americans, but boosts the views of Russians, Afghans, Bangladeshis, and Malaysians.

4.7. Explaining core state influence: Iran

4.7.1. The effects of religiosity, nationalism and foreign exposure. Religiosity, along the lines of our hypotheses, boosts Iranian influence in several Islamic publics, including Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Recall that in Pakistan we also witness the reductive effect of religiosity on American influence, a pattern that would be anticipated by Huntington. Nationalism plays no role in views of Iran, with one exception, China, where it interacts with religiosity. The sign on the interaction term is positive, producing an effect that is contrary to what is witnessed when US influence is the dependent variable (Figure 5).

Where the reputations of the United States and China appear, in large part, to benefit from public exposure to foreign cultures, the impact on Iran is the opposite.



Figure 5. Marginal Effect of Nationalism on Chinese Views of the US (A) and Iranian (B) Influence. Graphs plotted using (Boemke (2008).)

As publics in India, Hong Kong, and Singapore, as well as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, gain in cross-cultural interaction, their perceptions of Iranian influence on their respective countries decline.

4.7.2. Controls: education, living standard and gender. Where education appears to have a reductive impact on views of Iranian influence (South Korea, Taiwan, and Tajikistan), increases in living standard appear to have a positive impact in some Islamic publics (Kazakhstan, Maldives, and Pakistan). An interesting, and unexpected, gender effect is witnessed across several Asian publics. Among Chinese, Bangladeshis, and Tajiks, the effect of being male is positive on impressions of Iranian influence; among the publics of Hong Kong, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan, the effect is negative.

4.8. Summary: assessing the potential for intracivilizational cohesion and intercivilizational clash

The findings are summarized in Tables 3, 4, and 5. Plus (+) and minus (–) signs represent positive and negative logit coefficients whose z-scores reach a $p < 0.05$ standard or higher, respectively; zeroes (0) represent those that do not meet this standard.

Table 3. *Summaries from multivariate models: assessing intracivilizational cohesion among Western, Sinic, and Islamic publics*

		Religiosity	Nationalism	Foreign Exposure
Western	PH –> US	0	0	0
	AU –> US	+	0	0
	HK –> US	0	0	0
Sinic	SG –> CN	–	–	0
	KR –> CN	0	0	0
	TW –> CN	0	+	+
	VN –> CN	0	0	+
Islamic	PK –> IR	+	0	0
	AF –> IR	0	0	0
	BD –> IR	0	0	0
	TJ –> IR	0	0	0
	TM –> IR	+	0	0
	KG –> IR	+	0	–
	KZ –> IR	0	0	–
	UZ –> IR	+	0	–

Three points bear restating. First, nationalism plays a limited role in shaping perceptions of the world's hegemons in the region – with the exception of publics within, or in immediate proximity to, China. Second, increased levels of religious practice have the effect of both raising the profile of Iranian influence and lowering the profile of American influence. Religiosity in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, as displayed in solid lines in Figure 6, reveals positive, statistically significant marginal effects on the 'rather good' and 'good' response categories in the Iranian model. Conversely, Figure 7 exhibits the positive effects on the two negative categories, 'rather bad' and 'bad', for the American model among Indonesians (7a) and Malaysians (7b). Pakistan appears to be the better fit for Huntington, where religiosity boosts 'rather good' and 'good' responses to Iranian influence (6c) and 'rather bad' and 'bad' responses to American influence (7c).

The third point is that foreign exposure (dashed lines) often mitigates the effects of religiosity. With regard to Iran's influence in Turkmenistan, the boost given by religiosity remains the stronger effect of the two; in Kazakhstan, religiosity has no effect. For Uzbekis and Kyrgyz, however, the effect of foreign exposure is essentially the mirror of that offered by religion, boosting 'bad' and 'rather bad' responses at roughly the same rate that religiosity increases the 'rather good' and 'good' responses. With regard to American influence in Indonesia and Malaysia, foreign exposure appears to contribute to the negative influence of religiosity and nationalism. But in Pakistan, it boosts 'rather good', 'good', and 'neutral' responses – a counterweight to the effect of religiosity.

Table 4. *Summaries from multivariate models: assessing intercivilizational clash among Western, Sinic and Islamic Publics*

		Religiosity	Nationalism	Foreign Exposure
Sinic/Western	CN –> US	+*	0	+
	SG –> US	0	0	0
	KR –> US	0	0	0
	TW –> US	0	0	0
	VN –> US	+	0	+
	AU –> CN	0	0	+
	HK –> CN	0	+	+
	PH –> CN	0	0	0
Islamic/Western	AF –> US	0	0	+
	KZ –> US	0	0	0
	KG –> US	0	0	0
	TJ –> US	+	0	0
	TM –> US	0	0	0
	UZ –> US	0	0	0
	ID –> US	–	0	–
	MY –> US	–	–	0
	PK –> US	–	0	+
	BD –> US	0	0	0
	MV –> US	0	0	0
	HK –> IR	0	0	–
Islamic/Sinic	AF –> CN	0	0	+
	KZ –> CN	0	0	0
	KG –> CN	0	0	0
	TJ –> CN	0	–	0
	TM –> CN	0	0	+
	UZ –> CN	0	0	0
	ID –> CN	0	0	–
	MY –> CN	0	0	0
	PK –> CN	0	0	0
	BD –> CN	+	0	+
	MV –> CN	–	0	+
	CN –> IR	+*	0	0
	SG –> IR	0	0	–
	KR –> IR	0	0	0
	TW –> IR	0	0	0
	VN –> IR	0	0	0

*Effect produced by interaction with nationalism

Across civilizations, there are publics where foreign exposure lifts Chinese and American influence. For China, as we discussed, statistically significant effects appear among a handful of Islamic publics; comparable findings for the US would be those found in the Buddhist civilizational category. Where the two are at roughly equal public standing, like Afghanistan or Vietnam, the effects of foreign exposure are

Table 5. *Summaries from multivariate models: assessing intercivilizational clash among Orthodox, Japanese, Buddhist and Hindu publics.*

		Religiosity	Nationalism	Foreign Exposure
Orthodox/Western	RU –> US	+	0	0
Orthodox/Sinic	RU –> CN	0	0	0
Japanese/Western	JP –> US	–	0	0
Japanese/Sinic	JP –> CN	0	0	0
Hindu/Western	IN –> US	0	0	0
	NP–> US	0	0	0
Hindu/Sinic	IN –> CN	0	0	+
	NP –> CN	0	0	0
Buddhist/Sinic	BT –> CN	+	0	0
	KH –> CN	0	–	0
	LA –> CN	0	0	0
	LK –> CN	0	0	0
	MN –> CN	0	0	0
	TH –> CN	0	0	0
Buddhist/Western	BT –> US	0	0	0
	KH –> US	0	0	0
	LA –> US	+	+	+
	LK –> US	0	0	+
	MN –> US	0	0	+
	TH –> US	0	0	0
Islamic/Hindu	IN –> IR	0	0	0
	NP –> IR	0	0	–
Islamic/Buddhist	LK –> IR	0	0	0
	BT –> IR	0	0	0
	MN –> IR	0	0	0

comparable. In others, like Australia or Laos, one of the hegemons enjoys a greater benefit. Notably, foreign exposure has similar effects on Chinese impressions of US influence and American impressions of Chinese influence (Figure 8).

5. Discussion

One of the key assumptions of the 'clash of civilizations' framework revolves around the role of publics and their tendencies to discern 'us' from 'them' in geopolitical terms. This, according to Huntington, forms the basis of civilizational identities which, in turn, offer a basis for structuring international affairs. Following this logic, we surmised that publics would identify more strongly with the core states of their civilizational grouping and, as such, view the core states of rival civilizations more negatively. We also surmised that religiosity would strengthen those attachments. Globalization, defined here as an individual's everyday exposure to foreign cultures, would strengthen this pattern and, if Huntington's resurgence model were evident across publics, would work in a negative direction and exacerbate impressions of core states of out-civilizations.



Figure 6. Marginal Effects of Religiosity (solid lines) and Foreign Exposure (dashed) on Iranian Influence within Central Asian Publics (other variables held at their means)



Figure 7. Marginal Effects of Religiosity (solid lines), Nationalism (dotted) and Foreign Exposure (dashed) on American Influence within Predominantly Islamic Publics (other variables held at their means)

What we find in the Asian Pacific context are patterns that are more complex than those suggested by the Huntington model. There is some evidence, at a descriptive level, of divisions between the United States, China, and predominantly Islamic states – primarily among the Indonesian, Malaysian, and Pakistani publics. Some of this can be attributed to religiosity and, to a lesser extent, nationalism, as well as the interaction between the two. Moreover, there is evidence in our analysis of central Asian Islamic public affiliation with Iran as a potential core state. In half of the predominantly Islamic publics we tested, religiosity boosts opinions of Iranian influence. Consistent with some of Huntington's more controversial assertions about an 'Confucian Islamic connection', moreover, we find that several of these publics do indeed view China more favorably *vis-a-vis* the United States. The same goes for Chinese views of Iran. Support for the United States in Australia and Russia can be explained, in part, by increased levels of spiritual commitment, which lends further weight to some of Huntington's assumptions about the evolution of 'The West'.

At the same time, perceptions of core state influence do not manifest as a zero-sum game. In other words, where publics may identify more strongly with one relative to another, in doing so they do not necessarily perceive out-civilization core states substantively as 'bad influences'. Some predominantly Islamic publics see both Iran and America, in real terms, as either neutral or good influences; in terms of the United States and China, only Pakistan and Malaysia appear to clearly favor the latter. Taiwan and South Korea edge (or hedge) toward the US. This, combined with the ongoing antagonisms between the Chinese and Japanese publics, calls into question predictions about a cohesive Sinic civilization acting under the banner of Beijing. One of the key barriers would appear, as critics have asserted, to be the role of nationalism. But the effects do not extend much beyond the immediate Chinese sphere in Southeast Asia. Tension over territorial issues in the region since the timing of the surveys, in fact, may be inspiring nationalisms that are wary of growing Chinese power.

The challenge to Huntington, rather, comes with the influence of globalization. Indonesia appears to fit the resurgent response that he predicts, but it is unique. Instead, higher degrees of foreign exposure tend to improve perceptions of foreign state influence in some of the notoriously contentious intercivilizational dyads in the study, notably between Chinese and Americans. Foreign exposure, at the same time, often works against the influence of Iran, particularly in central Asia. Rather than imminent conflict, the evidence presented here suggests greater competition between American and Chinese soft power and development initiatives, while also suggesting the potential for improvement, at the micro-level, in Sino–US relations.

Ultimately, Huntington's expectations about the deterministic influence of religion on identity formation appear to be overstated. To the extent that it may be structured around core state affinities or enmities, a civilizational identity would appear to be susceptible to influences that pull it in conflicting directions. Exposure to imported products, traveling or communicating with others abroad has, in the face of greater religious and nationalist sentiments, the capacity to boost public perceptions of states



Figure 8. Comparing the Marginal Effects of Foreign Exposure on Chinese Attitudes toward US Influence (solid) and American Attitudes toward Chinese Influence (dashed)

that, in the Huntington frame, are destined to collide based on cultural or value difference. This does not necessarily lead us to endorse the 'universal civilization' thesis that Huntington makes considerable effort to refute, but does suggest that modernity, as Eisenstadt contends, may have its own effect upon the future identities of publics. If comparative politics and international relations should pursue the civilizational paradigm further, Katzenstein's middle-ground view that sees them as 'weakly institutionalized orders' appears, at this point, to be the approach that is more empirically plausible. Core states may help to define politics at the macro-level, but, in the face of globalization, their role in defining publics at the micro-level is far less clear.

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Quality of Life in Confucian Asia (Springer, 2010), *American Democracy Promotion* (Oxford University Press, 2000), *Reinventing the Alliance* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), *The Uses of Institutions* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), *Japanese Politics Today* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), *The US–Japan Security Alliance* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), and *Quality of Life in Asia* (Springer, forthcoming in 2012). He is Executive Editor of the *Japanese Journal of Political Science* (Cambridge University Press) and Director of the AsiaBarometer project.

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Appendix Table 1. *Country-Level Descriptives for Independent Variables of Interest*

	Religiosity						Nationalism						Foreign Exposure					
	N	Min	Max	Mean	SE	SD	N	Min	Max	Mean	SE	SD	N	Min	Max	Mean	SE	SD
US	974	1	5	3.721	0.048	1.493	1002	0	1	0.712	0.014	0.453	1002	0	6	1.363	0.049	1.551
RU	981	1	5	2.061	0.041	1.299	1055	0	1	0.215	0.013	0.411	1055	0	5	0.410	0.023	0.740
MY	991	1	5	4.433	0.036	1.126	1000	0	1	0.820	0.012	0.384	1000	0	6	1.204	0.028	0.891
AU	993	1	5	2.687	0.052	1.632	1000	0	1	0.467	0.016	0.499	1000	0	6	2.387	0.052	1.658
ID	999	1	5	4.725	0.025	0.783	1000	0	1	0.730	0.014	0.444	1000	0	3	0.418	0.018	0.581
PH	999	1	5	4.692	0.020	0.642	1000	0	1	0.784	0.013	0.412	1000	0	6	1.139	0.032	1.011
SG	1032	1	5	3.432	0.053	1.696	1038	0	1	0.813	0.012	0.390	1038	0	6	2.711	0.053	1.694
TH	1000	1	5	2.761	0.045	1.422	1000	0	1	0.969	0.005	0.173	1000	0	6	0.421	0.026	0.816
JP	2001	1	5	2.555	0.035	1.574	2015	0	1	0.793	0.009	0.405	2015	0	6	0.705	0.024	1.095
KR	1013	1	5	2.480	0.048	1.543	1023	0	1	0.898	0.009	0.302	1023	0	6	0.760	0.029	0.918
VN	1000	1	5	2.176	0.032	1.014	1000	0	1	0.792	0.013	0.406	1000	0	6	0.885	0.029	0.919
CN	2996	1	5	1.531	0.018	0.996	3000	0	1	0.923	0.005	0.267	3000	0	6	0.462	0.014	0.744
IN	2287	1	5	4.687	0.018	0.884	2290	0	1	0.866	0.007	0.341	2290	0	6	0.468	0.017	0.810
PK	1050	1	5	4.274	0.031	1.012	1086	0	1	0.499	0.015	0.500	1086	0	6	0.643	0.033	1.082
AF	872	2	5	4.956	0.009	0.272	874	0	1	0.141	0.012	0.348	874	0	4	0.739	0.026	0.769
LK	812	1	5	3.642	0.053	1.501	813	0	1	0.815	0.014	0.388	813	0	6	0.857	0.032	0.900
HK	999	1	5	1.501	0.036	1.135	1000	0	1	0.495	0.016	0.500	1000	0	6	1.125	0.042	1.331
KH	1012	1	5	3.709	0.036	1.157	1012	0	1	0.361	0.015	0.480	1012	0	6	1.472	0.027	0.868
LA	1000	1	5	3.375	0.037	1.182	1000	0	1	0.638	0.015	0.481	1000	0	6	1.688	0.028	0.894
BD	1007	1	5	4.442	0.027	0.841	1008	0	1	0.797	0.013	0.403	1008	0	4	0.632	0.024	0.750
TW	1001	1	5	1.988	0.037	1.155	1006	0	1	0.821	0.012	0.383	1006	0	6	0.893	0.032	1.007
MV	821	4	5	4.598	0.017	0.491	821	0	1	0.862	0.012	0.345	821	0	6	2.382	0.058	1.671
BT	795	1	5	3.842	0.050	1.402	801	0	1	0.818	0.014	0.386	801	0	6	1.901	0.047	1.334
MN	793	1	5	2.169	0.037	1.038	800	0	1	0.494	0.018	0.500	800	0	6	0.774	0.037	1.047
NP	800	1	5	3.896	0.050	1.406	800	0	1	0.661	0.017	0.474	800	0	6	1.480	0.045	1.267
TJ	794	1	5	2.957	0.058	1.621	800	0	1	0.329	0.017	0.470	800	0	5	0.980	0.033	0.932
TM	588	1	5	2.697	0.079	1.918	800	0	1	0.131	0.012	0.338	800	0	4	0.404	0.025	0.694
KG	797	1	5	2.434	0.058	1.629	800	0	1	0.364	0.017	0.481	800	0	5	0.861	0.033	0.925
KZ	780	1	5	2.058	0.043	1.206	800	0	1	0.230	0.015	0.421	800	0	6	0.860	0.034	0.973
UZ	796	1	5	3.095	0.056	1.578	800	0	1	0.420	0.017	0.494	800	0	6	1.611	0.041	1.155

Appendix Table 2. *US Model: Islamic and Hindu Publics*

	AF	BD	ID	KZ	KG	MY	MV	PK	TJ	TM	UZ	IN	NP
Nat	0.33	−0.16	−0.14	0.31	0.40	−1.08*	−1.16	0.23	0.82**	−0.22	0.50	−0.18	0.67
	(2.84)	(0.66)	(0.74)	(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.51)	(1.87)	(0.54)	(0.29)	(0.41)	(0.29)	(0.59)	(0.45)
Rel	−0.18	0.02	−0.30*	−0.11	−0.04	−0.49***	−0.56	−0.20**	0.00	−0.04	−0.01	0.04	0.09
	(0.37)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.37)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.09)
ForEx	0.39***	0.14	−0.40***	−0.01	−0.09	0.02	0.00	0.20***	0.01	−0.11	0.06	0.07	−0.03
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
StLiv	−0.04	0.10	−0.03	0.17	0.22*	−0.26**	0.23*	0.21***	0.19*	−0.19*	0.23**	0.20***	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.11)
Educ	0.28**	−0.06	−0.22*	−0.05	−0.22*	0.19	0.10	−0.30***	−0.17	−0.14	−0.15	0.30***	0.10
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Male	−0.01	0.21	−0.08	0.00	−0.23	−0.18	−0.02	0.09	−0.04	−0.04	−0.12	−0.01	−0.26
	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.15)
Age	0.00	−0.01*	0.00	0.00	−0.01*	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.01**	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
nat*rel	−0.14	0.07	0.00	−0.14	0.03	0.14	0.48	0.03	−0.22*	0.05	−0.10	−0.04	−0.06
	(0.57)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.40)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Con	−5.21**	−2.46***	−3.22***	−2.36***	−2.49***	−4.37***	−2.87	−2.01***	−2.69***	−3.58***	−2.00***	−2.09***	−2.96***
	(1.93)	(0.62)	(0.69)	(0.49)	(0.45)	(0.60)	(1.79)	(0.39)	(0.43)	(0.52)	(0.49)	(0.60)	(0.54)
Con	−3.13	−0.86	−2.29***	−0.32	−1.31**	−2.95***	−2.19	−0.71	−1.43***	−3.20***	−0.72	−0.96	−1.21*
	(1.90)	(0.61)	(0.68)	(0.48)	(0.44)	(0.59)	(1.79)	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.51)	(0.49)	(0.59)	(0.48)
Con	−2.32	0.54	−0.71	1.27**	0.22	−1.83**	−0.54	0.71	0.06	−0.48	0.55	0.97	0.46
	(1.90)	(0.61)	(0.68)	(0.48)	(0.44)	(0.59)	(1.79)	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.59)	(0.47)
Con	−0.78	2.11***	0.72	3.46***	1.65***	0.18	0.40	2.64***	1.80***	0.13	2.33***	2.41***	3.37***
	(1.90)	(0.61)	(0.69)	(0.52)	(0.45)	(0.59)	(1.79)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.59)	(0.49)
Obs	859	1006	999	775	794	991	797	1041	790	564	796	2280	756

***$p < .001$ **$p < .01$ *$p < .05$

Appendix Table 3. *US Model: Sinic, Orthodox, Japanese, Western and Buddhist Publics*

	CN	SG	KR	TW	VN	RU	JP	AU	HK	PH	BT	KH	LA	MN	LK	TH
Nat	0.25	−0.45	−0.13	0.05	0.49	0.54	−0.23	0.02	0.15	1.38	0.48	0.04	0.79*	0.14	−0.43	0.47
	(0.21)	(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.28)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.95)	(0.48)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.32)	(0.74)	(0.68)
Rel	0.18*	0.02	0.07	−0.02	0.25*	0.13*	−0.12*	0.11*	0.04	0.28	0.13	0.11	0.17*	0.12	0.05	0.02
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.21)
ForEx	0.20***	−0.02	−0.06	0.02	0.14*	0.16	−0.05	−0.07	−0.02	0.02	−0.08	−0.02	0.20**	0.17*	0.18*	0.15
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
StLiv	0.04	0.18*	0.17*	−0.09	0.15	0.39***	0.25***	0.03	−0.13	−0.01	0.21	0.07	−0.27**	0.14	0.16	−0.23*
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.12)
Educ	0.15**	0.11	0.01	0.12	−0.02	−0.12	−0.09	−0.05	0.10	−0.16	−0.33***	−0.06	0.00	0.15	−0.22	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.08)
Male	−0.08	0.13	0.01	−0.09	0.30*	−0.17	0.27**	0.32**	0.05	−0.02	0.00	0.14	0.11	0.32*	−0.46***	−0.01
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Age	0.00	−0.01	0.02***	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01*	0.00	0.00	−0.02**	−0.01	−0.01	0.00	−0.01*	0.00	−0.01	−0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
nat*rel	−0.21*	0.04	−0.04	0.01	−0.17	−0.23*	0.12	−0.04	−0.02	−0.36	−0.02	−0.01	−0.07	0.07	−0.04	0.00
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.20)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.21)
Con	−1.30***	−3.85***	−1.35*	−4.56***	−2.53***	−1.06**	−2.78***	−2.41***	−4.89***	−4.11***	−4.05***	−4.87***	−2.97***	−3.46***	−3.20***	−5.52***
	(0.28)	(0.54)	(0.58)	(0.65)	(0.50)	(0.40)	(0.33)	(0.40)	(0.53)	(0.90)	(0.69)	(0.66)	(0.47)	(0.56)	(0.86)	(0.85)
Con	0.18	−2.43***	0.41	−2.85***	−0.43	0.97*	−0.81*	−0.42	−2.13***	−3.18***	−2.73***	−2.95***	−1.46**	−2.04***	−1.65	−2.93***
	(0.28)	(0.50)	(0.57)	(0.61)	(0.47)	(0.40)	(0.32)	(0.39)	(0.47)	(0.86)	(0.64)	(0.51)	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.85)	(0.79)
Con	1.97***	−0.32	1.52**	−1.22*	1.42**	2.55***	0.99**	0.82*	−0.32	−1.36	0.37	−1.35**	0.44	0.96*	−0.32	−1.27
	(0.28)	(0.49)	(0.57)	(0.60)	(0.47)	(0.41)	(0.32)	(0.39)	(0.47)	(0.85)	(0.62)	(0.49)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.85)	(0.78)
Con	4.07***	1.54**	4.23***	1.53*	3.07***	4.80***	3.12***	2.94***	3.03***	0.96	1.78**	0.34	1.81***	2.82***	1.26	0.97
	(0.30)	(0.49)	(0.59)	(0.60)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.33)	(0.41)	(0.51)	(0.84)	(0.62)	(0.49)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.85)	(0.78)
Obs	2990	1032	1011	998	1000	967	1981	982	997	990	788	1012	998	788	799	1000

***$p < .001$ **$p < .01$ *$p < .05$

Appendix Table 4. *China Model: Islamic and Hindu Publics*

	AF	BD	ID	KZ	KG	MY	MV	PK	TJ	TM	UZ	IN	NP
Nat	−0.92	1.35	−0.40	−0.41	0.28	−0.56	−2.63	0.83	−0.07	−0.10	0.05	0.66	0.57
	(2.60)	(0.77)	(0.74)	(0.31)	(0.24)	(0.58)	(1.91)	(0.58)	(0.29)	(0.51)	(0.30)	(0.58)	(0.49)
Rel	−0.40	0.30*	−0.03	−0.09	0.05	−0.22	−0.75*	0.12	−0.13**	0.08	0.03	−0.02	0.06
	(0.34)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.38)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.09)
ForEx	0.27**	0.34***	−0.24*	−0.03	0.14	−0.02	0.18***	0.07	−0.08	0.28*	−0.05	0.14**	−0.09
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)
StLiv	0.10	0.13	0.23**	−0.01	0.07	0.01	0.29**	0.31***	0.24**	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.34**
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.11)
Educ	0.22*	0.22*	−0.02	−0.13	−0.19	0.23*	−0.06	0.08	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.08	0.29**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Male	−0.32*	0.59***	−0.04	−0.11	0.22	0.12	0.20	0.29*	0.04	0.02	0.20	0.03	0.36*
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.16)
Age	−0.01*	0.00	−0.01	0.00	0.01	−0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
nat*rel	0.14	−0.13	0.04	0.13	−0.04	0.15	0.82*	−0.11	0.02	−0.12	0.03	−0.20	−0.06
	(0.53)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.40)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Con	−7.87***	−2.74**	−2.80***	−3.54***	−1.69***	−6.92***	−4.44*	−3.36***	−2.96***	0.8	−1.94***	−2.86***	−4.63***
	(1.89)	(0.86)	(0.69)	(0.50)	(0.44)	(0.97)	(1.85)	(0.57)	(0.44)	(0.53)	(0.50)	(0.58)	(1.11)
Con	−6.94***	−1.07	−1.61*	−1.92***	−0.46	−3.37***	−2.70	−2.75***	−2.12***	1.45**	−0.67	−1.57**	−1.61**
	(1.81)	(0.74)	(0.69)	(0.49)	(0.44)	(0.67)	(1.84)	(0.50)	(0.42)	(0.54)	(0.49)	(0.58)	(0.54)
Con	−3.44*	2.20**	0.28	−0.09	1.01*	−1.43*	−1.37	0.32	−0.49		0.85	0.11	0.80
	(1.75)	(0.73)	(0.69)	(0.48)	(0.44)	(0.66)	(1.84)	(0.41)	(0.41)		(0.49)	(0.58)	(0.51)
Con	−1.56	3.88***	2.14**	1.60**	2.20***	1.33*	−0.31	1.84***	1.24**		2.44***	1.91***	3.72***
	(1.75)	(0.73)	(0.69)	(0.49)	(0.44)	(0.66)	(1.84)	(0.42)	(0.41)		(0.50)	(0.58)	(0.53)
Obs	859	1006	999	775	794	991	797	1041	790	564	796	2280	756

***$p < .001$ **$p < .01$ *$p < .05$

Appendix Table 5. *China Model: Western, Japanese, Sinic, Orthodox and Buddhist Publics*

	US	AU	HK	PH	JP	SG	KR	TW	TW#	VN	RU	BT	KH	LA	MN	LK	TH
Nat	0.15	−0.09	0.66**	0.14	0.21	−1.28***	0.07	1.04***	−0.15*	−0.15	0.13	1.21**	−0.95*	0.62	0.04	0.59	0.40
	(0.35)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.93)	(0.19)	(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.29)	(0.07)	(0.34)	(0.29)	(0.45)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.31)	(0.69)	(0.70)
Rel	0.01	0.06	−0.10	−0.10	0.05	−0.19*	0.06	0.14	−0.12	0.02	0.07	0.16	0.00	0.12	0.06	−0.01	0.27
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.21)
ForEx	0.20***	0.09*	0.14**	−0.09	0.02	−0.04	−0.03	0.16**	0.16*	0.18**	0.01	0.09	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.13	−0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
StLiv	−0.04	0.04	0.11	0.13	0.04	0.24**	0.20*	0.23	0.27	0.13	0.19*	0.11	0.09	0.12	0.02	0.20*	−0.10
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)
Educ	−0.22*	0.25**	0.06	−0.02	−0.01	0.01	0.17	0.14	0.15	0.10	0.16*	−0.26**	0.03	0.09	0.04	−0.01	0.16*
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.08)
Male	−0.16	0.55***	0.29*	−0.23	0.16	0.29*	−0.08	−0.10	−0.09	0.29*	0.01	−0.40**	−0.03	0.48***	−0.11	0.26	0.33**
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Age	−0.01**	−0.01	0.01*	−0.02***	−0.01**	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01*	0.01	−0.01	−0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
nat*rel	0.00	−0.04	0.00	−0.06	−0.04	0.26**	−0.06	−0.15	0.21**	0.11	−0.06	−0.18	0.28**	−0.04	0.04	−0.06	−0.12
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.20)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.21)
Con	−3.55***	−2.01***	−4.14***	−4.04***	−2.30***	−4.51***	−2.24***	0.00	−1.15	−2.34***	−2.27***	−1.00	−3.40***	−2.51***	−0.48	−5.09***	−4.43***
	(0.50)	(0.42)	(0.69)	(0.84)	(0.33)	(0.57)	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.59)	(0.50)	(0.43)	(0.61)	(0.51)	(0.53)	(0.42)	(1.07)	(0.88)
Con	−1.61**	−0.28	−0.97*	−3.13***	−0.18	−3.07***	0.03	1.67**	0.50	−0.73	−0.07	−0.22	−1.74***	−0.85	0.72	−2.77***	−2.69**
	(0.49)	(0.40)	(0.49)	(0.84)	(0.32)	(0.51)	(0.56)	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.48)	(0.41)	(0.61)	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.42)	(0.84)	(0.82)
Con	0.53	1.89***	0.91	−1.62	1.73***	−0.44	1.65**	3.14***	1.92**	1.54**	2.04***	2.21***	−0.02	0.68	2.21***	−0.09	−0.24
	(0.49)	(0.41)	(0.49)	(0.83)	(0.32)	(0.49)	(0.57)	(0.58)	(0.59)	(0.48)	(0.42)	(0.62)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.42)	(0.81)	(0.81)
Con	2.15***	4.46***	3.70***	0.83	3.58***	1.30**	4.43***	5.82***	4.60***	2.95***	5.12***	3.57***	2.15***	2.64***	3.84***	1.63*	2.40**
	(0.50)	(0.44)	(0.51)	(0.83)	(0.35)	(0.49)	(0.59)	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.49)	(0.48)	(0.63)	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.81)	(0.81)
Obs	955	982	997	990	1981	1032	1011	998	967	1000	967	788	1012	998	788	799	1000

***$p < .001$ **$p < .01$ *$p < .05$

#proud measure used for nationalism variable

Appendix Table 6. *Iran Model: Islamic and Hindu Publics*

	AF	BD	KZ	KG	MV	PK	TJ	TM	UZ	IN	NP
Nat	−0.81	−0.18	0.59	0.18	−0.62	−0.25	0.07	0.71	0.43	0.69	0.29
	(2.12)	(0.80)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(2.10)	(0.54)	(0.30)	(0.46)	(0.32)	(0.84)	(0.94)
Rel	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.19**	−0.25	0.15*	0.03	0.10*	0.14*	0.17	−0.13
	(0.31)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.42)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.18)
ForEx	0.01	0.15	−0.21**	−0.18*	−0.03	0.07	−0.11	−0.04	−0.14*	−0.14*	−0.15
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.13)
StLiv	−0.03	0.16	0.30**	0.03	0.28**	0.22***	0.09	−0.17	0.13	−0.03	0.17
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.21)
Educ	0.08	0.10	−0.11	−0.17	0.02	0.04	−0.40***	0.19	−0.11	0.27**	0.18
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.19)
Male	−0.18	0.52***	0.14	−0.06	0.10	−0.39**	0.47**	−0.41*	0.25	0.20	−0.01
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.31)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.01	0.00	0.00	−0.02**	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
nat*rel	0.19	0.12	−0.14	−0.10	0.25	0.03	−0.05	−0.23	−0.05	−0.15	0.07
	(0.43)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.45)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.22)
Con	−3.54*	−2.85***	−1.66**	−3.21***	−2.49	−3.33***	−6.47***	−2.33***	−1.87***	−1.44	−3.94***
	(1.56)	(0.78)	(0.53)	(0.54)	(2.03)	(0.47)	(0.66)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.83)	(1.04)
Con	−1.86	−1.70*	−0.22	−1.96***	−1.76	−2.23***	−4.41***	−1.83***	−0.62	−0.57	−2.89**
	(1.55)	(0.74)	(0.52)	(0.53)	(2.03)	(0.42)	(0.47)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.83)	(1.00)
Con	−0.68	1.94**	2.82***	1.57**	1.43	0.43	−2.77***	1.32*	2.27***	2.06*	3.85***
	(1.55)	(0.75)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(2.03)	(0.40)	(0.44)	(0.53)	(0.54)	(0.83)	(1.02)
Con	0.89	3.38***	4.26***	3.39***	2.41	2.29***	−0.60	2.12***	4.32***	4.05***	6.16***
	(1.55)	(0.75)	(0.57)	(0.56)	(2.03)	(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.53)	(0.58)	(0.84)	(1.16)
Obs	859	1006	775	794	797	1041	790	564	796	1234	756

***$p < .001$ **$p < .01$ *$p < .05$

Appendix Table 7. *Iran Model: Western, Japanese, Sinic and Buddhist Publics*

	HK	JP	CN	SG	KR	TW	VN	BT	MN	LK
Nat	−0.09	−0.44	−0.16	−0.40	−0.40	−0.12	0.20	−0.07	0.00	0.33
	(0.21)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.44)	(0.33)	(0.43)	(0.70)	(0.52)	(0.88)
Rel	0.03	−0.11	−0.13	0.05	−0.03	−0.14	0.05	−0.19	0.12	0.04
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.18)
ForEx	−0.10*	−0.11	0.14	−0.12**	0.08	0.07	0.01	−0.02	−0.10	−0.08
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)
StLiv	0.18	−0.05	0.01	0.21*	−0.08	0.01	−0.12	0.29	0.12	0.14
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.12)
Educ	0.05	−0.07	0.04	−0.16	−0.41**	−0.28**	0.14	−0.02	−0.05	0.05
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.17)
Male	−0.32*	−0.24	0.33**	−0.06	−0.03	0.06	0.05	−0.29	−0.07	−0.12
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.17)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.01	−0.02***	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
nat*rel	0.06	0.14	0.24*	−0.02	0.00	0.13	−0.12	0.17	0.01	−0.16
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.19)
Con	−2.39***	−2.48***	−4.26***	−2.74***	−5.27***	−3.09***	−2.77***	−2.80**	−3.08***	−4.40***
	(0.52)	(0.50)	(0.45)	(0.53)	(0.69)	(0.65)	(0.61)	(0.94)	(0.75)	(1.06)
Con	−0.26	−1.06*	−2.21***	−1.38**	−3.61***	−1.13	−1.42*	−1.88*	−2.11**	−2.63*
	(0.51)	(0.49)	(0.41)	(0.52)	(0.68)	(0.64)	(0.60)	(0.92)	(0.73)	(1.02)
Con	3.89***	2.76***	1.86***	1.83***	0.48	2.48***	3.14***	3.40***	3.59***	1.57
	(0.54)	(0.52)	(0.40)	(0.53)	(0.67)	(0.65)	(0.61)	(0.93)	(0.75)	(1.02)
Con		4.90***	3.89***	3.53***	3.05***	4.49***	5.28***	5.09***	5.04***	3.97***
		(0.70)	(0.42)	(0.57)	(0.82)	(0.71)	(0.74)	(0.97)	(0.81)	(1.05)
Obs	997	988	1994	1032	1011	998	1000	788	788	799

***$p < .001$ **$p < .01$ *$p < .05$

Multiple Modes of Well-Being in Asia

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Abstract: In this chapter I propose the typology of societies in Asia on the basis of 50 odd thousand respondents to the AsiaBarometer Surveys conducted every year between 2003 and 2008. Each respondent was asked to choose five from among 25 lifestyle aspects such as health, home, diet. job and family. I factor-analyzed responses society by society with five societal types using the two heavily loaded dimensions after varimax rotation: materialism, post-materialism, and public sector dominance. Ab type (materialism dominance followed by post-materialism: Japan, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan), Ac type (materialism followed by public sector dominance: China, South Korea, Taiwan, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Mongolia), B type (post-materialism followed by materialism: Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Kyrgyzstan), Ca type (post-materialism followed by public sector dominance: Brunei, the Philippines, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan), Cb type (public sector dominance followed by materialism: Singapore and the Maldives. This is a thoroughly evidence-based typology of societies as seen from bottom in the daily lives of ordinary people in Asia.

Key words: lifestyle aspects, materialism, post-materialism, public sector dominance, evidence-based typology of societies, AsiaBarometer, 28 Asian societies,

1. INTRODUCTION

The definition of well-being depends primarily on subjective assessment about how you feel about yourself in society. Especially the adjective, well, is bound to be highly

subjective. Thus when we discuss well-being, multiple modes of well-being is a natural phrasing. Hence, well-being is defined by how positively or negatively an individual feels about her/his existence in society, whether it is about happiness, health, prosperity, accomplishment, or whatever other area is under consideration. This definition is quite appropriate when I examine well-being in Asia. Asia is not only demographically dense but also economically dynamic. But most important here is the diversity of well-being in Asia. And this is why I titled my essay multiple modes of well-being. Thus, leading to my use of multiple well-beings.

Multiple well-beings might remind one of multiple modernities. Multiple modernities contain the dimension of time and evolution. The idea is that modernity is not a singular evolution of society that commences with the liberation of art from Christianity (e.g., Rafael), science (e.g., Gallilleo), politics (e.g., Reformation) through the industrial revolution and democratization as experienced in Western Europe. There must be many distinctive paths observed in reaching modernity. Also, modernity is defined in so many ways. Hence, the ascendance of the concept of multiple modernities has gained a general acceptance (Eisenstadt, 2002, 2006). In a similar vein, multiple well-beings should be examined. One of the most important features of multiple well-beings is that it can be specified not only at the national level but also at the individual level. This feature distinguishes itself from multiple modernities. That multiple well-beings can be specified at the individual level enables this concept to be amenable to scientific empirical testing of the strictest kind. The concept of multiple modernities is also amenable to scientific empirical testing (Bates & Levi et al. 1998). But it is not of a strict kind. It is more by the case study or systematic comparative method. In this respect multiple well-beings allow one to be used as a pluri-potent concept: Pluri-potent is most frequently used in relation to a stem cell that has multiple potentials in its growth. This stream of analysis excludes individual well-being, group well-being, national well-being, supra-national well-being (regional well-being, well-being by religion, well-being by beliefs, well-being by gender, well-being by race, well-being by class, well-being by income level, well-being by educational level, well-being by language, etc).

2. MULTIPLE WELL-BEINGS AS PRIORITIZED LIFE ASPECTS

In the AsiaBarometer Survey (Inoguchi, 2012; Inoguchi & Fujii, 2012) that we executed annually between 2003 and 2008, we posed five questions in areas that impact the respondents' perception on quality of life and lifestyle. Life aspects include such items

as health, home, job, family, income, being devote, and medical care, and workplace success. We have 50,000 odd observations in the AsiaBarometer Survey. We simply count the number of chosen priorities in all of Asia and by country.

Question: Of the following lifestyle aspects or life circumstances, please select the five that are most important. (Twenty lifestyle aspects or life circumstances are listed in the surveys in 2003, 2004, and 2005. Twenty-five lifestyle aspects or life circumstances are listed in the surveys in 2006, 2007, and 2008. The selection of "none of the above" and "don't know" responses are listed.)

Table 1.

Lifestyle Aspects Each Respondent Asked to Choose Five from among Those Listed Below.

Lifestyle Aspects	Important	Not mentioned
1 Appreciating art and culture	1	0
2 Being able to live without fear of crime	1	0
3 Being devout	1	0
4 Being famous	1	0
5 Being healthy	1	0
6 Being on good terms with others	1	0
7 Being successful at work	1	0
8 Contributing to your local community or to society	1	0
9 Don't know	1	0
10 Dressing up	1	0
11 Earning a high income	1	0
12 Enjoying leisure	1	0
13 Expressing your personality or using your talents	1	0
14 Freedom of expression and association *	1	0
15 Having a comfortable home	1	0
16 Having a job	1	0
17 Having access to good medical care if required	1	0
18 Having access to higher education (beyond compulsory schooling)	1	0
19 Having enough to eat	1	0
20 Having pleasant community to live *	1	0
21 Having safe and clean environment *	1	0
22 Living in a country with a good government *	1	0
23 None of the above	1	0
24 Owning lots of nice things	1	0
25 Raising children *	1	0
26 Spending time with your family	1	0
27 Winning over others	1	0

*Aspects numbered 21 through 25 were added to surveys in 2006, 2007, and 2008.

Asia-wide refers to the regions of East, Southeast, South, and Central Asia. For the countries within these regions, the most highly prioritized life aspects or domains are in the following order: health, home, diet, job, and family.

National diversity is our focus. To better and more parsimoniously handle national diversities, we have factor-analyzed country by country, with a varimax rotation, prioritized life aspects or domains (for details, see Inoguchi & Fujii, 2012). Three factors have emerged: the materialist factor, the post-materialist factor, and the public sector dominance factor. The materialist factor is determined by such priorities as housing, standard of living, household income, health, education, and job. The post-materialist factor is characterized by such priorities as friendships, marriage, neighbors, family life, leisure, spiritual life, and public safety. The public sector dominance factor is composed of such priorities as condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The materialist factor is also called the QOL-sustaining factor, whereas the post-materialist factor is called the QOL-enriching factor and the public sector dominant factor is called the QOL-enabling factor. It is worth remembering that, when the factor analysis was applied Asia-wide to all the 29 countries, the first factor's eigenvalue is 5.4, compared to the second factor's value of 1.0 and the third factor's eigenvalues of 0.5. Thus, from an Asia-wide perspective, the materialist factor is dominant. The post-materialist and public sector dominance factors are auxiliary. Here, it is important to note that: (1) the materialist factor is not always the most important in life; (2) the post-materialist factor is not always the second most important factor, which develops after the materialist factor is met in life; and (3) the public sector dominance factor is not always the least important of the three factors. National diversity is pronounced. That is determined by the configuration of life prioritizing of individuals and many other factors that are above individual preference and also beyond individual control.

To view national diversity, we factor-analyzed life aspects or domain priorities country by country. Here, it is very important to note at the outset that not all countries exhibit an overwhelming dominance of the materialist factor. If we look at the first two factors only and categorize country types on how the three factors are deemed important in terms of the size of eigenvalues country by country, the following life priority types can be listed: Ab, Ac, Ba, Bc, Ca, Cb.

Table 2.
Generating society typology through life aspect prioritizing from bottom (factor dimensions after varimax rotation.)

	1	2
Ab	materialism	post-materialism
Ac	materialism	public sector dominance
B	post-materialism	materialism
Ca	post-materialism	public sector dominance
Cb	public sector dominance	materialism

Because there is empirically no Bc type, the distinction between Ba and Bc is not necessary. Therefore, we use B, and not Ba or Bc. Hence, there are five life priority types empirically: Ab, Ac, B, Ca and Cb. Which countries fit one of these types?

Ab five societies: Japan, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.
Ac ten societies: China, South Korea, Taiwan, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Mongolia.
B five societies: Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Kyrgystan.
Ca six societies: Brunei, the Philippines, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Kazakhstan.
Cb two societies: Singapore and the Maldives.

Ab refers to the materialist factor dominance, followed by the auxiliary post-materialist factor. The following five countries belong to the Ab type: Japan, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Ac refers to the materialist factor dominance, followed by the auxiliary public sector dominance factor. The following ten countries/societies are of the Ac type: China, South Korea, Taiwan, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Mongolia. B refers to the post-materialist factor dominance, followed by the auxiliary materialist factor. The following countries/societies belong to the B type: Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Kyrgystan. Ca refers to the post-materialist factor dominance, followed by the auxiliary public sector dominance factor. The following six countries/societies are of Ca type: Brunei, the Philippines, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Kazakhstan. Cb refers to the public sector dominance factor, followed by the auxiliary materialist factor. The following countries/societies are of the Cb type: Singapore and the Maldives.

The above life priorities based typology and its "membership" may not be familiar to some readers. To other readers, materialism and post-materialism are familiar from the immensely influential writings of Ronald Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997, 2005). However, his meaning of these two concepts is very different from our meaning of the terms. Here, materialism refers to QOL-sustaining and post-materialism refers to QOL-enriching. In addition to materialism and post-materialism, prioritized life aspects also reflect those public sector dominant societies. This is called the public sector dominant dominance factor or the QOL-enabling factor, because without public sector infrastructure and public policy management, people's lives are sometimes unsustainable. The use of these two terms are very clearly differentiated from Inglehart's use of materialism and post-materialism. Due to the lack of better concepts, we use materialism and post-materialism in a very different sense. Our use is justified because our concepts are based on prioritized life aspects in Asia, much closer and broader concepts of life preference patterns. It is very critical to note at this point that these types are rooted in a comprehensive, systematic, and empirical analysis of the daily life priorities as reported by 50,000 odd respondents throughout Asia (Inoguchi and Fujii, 2012; cf. Kato, 2012). The picture that emerges of these countries/societies represents, in a sense, a snapshot from below. In other words, the result is an evidence-based typology of societies.

3. PROFILES OF COUNTRIES/SOCIETIES AS SEEN FROM BELOW

Ab type: Weak State-Strong Society

The Ab type social system includes Afghanistan, Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Let me examine each country one by one. Lifestyle priorities in Afghanistan are: diet, health, home, being devout, and job in this order. It is significant to note the high priority given to diet and being devout. The life domains that weigh heavily on the materialist factor are: marriage, standard of living, household income, health, education, job, and neighbors. The valuable point in this data is the high priority given to marriage, capped by the materialist factor. The life domains that are prominent on the post-materialist factor are: housing, friendships, family life, and spiritual life. The life domains that figure heavily on the public sector dominance factor are: condition of the environment, social welfare system, democratic system, and leisure.

Let me turn to Indonesia. Lifestyle priorities in Indonesia are: health, diet, home, being devout, and job in this order. In this country study, the significance of the data is the

high ranking given to being devout. The life domains that emphasize heavily on the materialist factor are: housing, standard of living, household income, education, and job. The life domains that rise to prominence for the post-materialist factor are: friendships, marriage, health, neighbors, public safety, family life, and spiritual life. The life domains that are significant in the public sector dominance factor are: condition of the environment, social welfare system, democratic system, and leisure.

In Japan, lifestyle priorities in are: health, family, job, home, others in this order. It is worth noting that others receive a high priority in Japanese society. Attention to others is very much a matter of social survival (Inoguchi, 2011; Nakane, 1970). The life domains heavily featured on the materialist factor are: housing, standard of living, household income, education, and job. The life domains highly valued in the post-materialist factor are: friendships, marriage, health, family life, leisure, and spiritual life. The life domains that played prominently in the public sector dominance factor are: neighbors, public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The prioritized life aspects in Japanese society appear to be roughly harmonious with Inglehart's materialism and post-materialism. This convergence is natural as Ingelehart deals primarily with advanced industrial democracies, and Japan is one of them in Asia.

In Taiwan, lifestyle priorities are not available as life priorities were not measured there. The life domains expressed heavily in the materialist factor of Taiwan are: standard of living, household income, health, job, leisure, and housing. The value placed on leisure on the materialist factor for Taiwan is significant. The life domains highly appreciated in the post-materialist factor are: friendships, marriage, neighbors, family life, and spiritual life. The life domains valued heavily in the public sector dominance factor in Taiwan are: public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system.

In Tajikistan, lifestyle priorities are: health, diet, home, job, and income in this order. The valued life domains that emerge from the materialist factor are: housing, standard of living, household income, health, education, job, democratic system, leisure, and spiritual life. It is important to note that such life spheres as democratic system, leisure, and spiritual life play heavily on the materialist factor. The life domains that rise to prominence in the post-materialist factor are: friendships, marriage, neighbors, public safety, and family life. It is significant that public safety is part of the leading life

aspects in the post-materialist factor. The life domains that are particularly valued in the public sector dominance factor are: condition of the environment and social welfare system.

In Uzbekistan, lifestyle priorities are: health, home, income, job, diet in this order. The life domains that stood out in the materialist factor are: housing, standard of living, household income, health, education, job, neighbors, leisure, and spiritual life. It is important to note that neighbors, leisure, and spiritual life are included in this category. They are associated closely with survival (Dadabaev, 2006). The life domains that determined the post-materialist factor are: friendships, marriage, and family life. The life domains heavily loaded on the public sector dominance factor are: public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system.

It is not too odd to characterize Afghanistan, Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as a weak state, but strong society. A strong society is exemplified by the heavy emphasis given to certain life priorities on the materialist factor, such as neighbors, others, spiritual life, family life, and public safety. Chie Nakane's (1970) account of Japanese society, Takeshi Matsui's (2011) account of Pushtun tribal communities, and Timor Dadabaev's account of Uzbekistan neighborhood communities roughly corroborate this feature of the Ab type social system. The societal picture that emerges in the next section reveals similarities with societies not conventionally associated with the picture that emerged in the abovesection, most notably by regime type (Dahl, 1971; Linz, 2000; Blondel, 2012).

Of the five countries/societies, Japan and Indonesia are noted for their weak state-strong society pattern. In another survey-based study (Blondel & Inoguchi, 2006), which focused on Asia and Europe, citizens' identities, citizens' confidence in the state, and citizens' satisfaction in the performance of the state in 18 countries/societies are examined. Canonical correlation analysis of those responses has yielded the countries/societies types on a diagram in which Japan and Indonesia are spatially similar in their location. Both countries/societies are noted for weak identity, weak confidence in the state, and weak satisfaction in the state's performance.

Afghanistan arguably has no state of which to speak. It has strong tribal communities (Matsui, 2011). Tribal groups have a very strong sense of self-identity. They reside and move as their herds search for new grass growing on the plains. Their group solidarity

and fierce spirit to fight tenaciously against what they consider to be intruders are well known. The Pushtuns and Baluchis are two such groups that anthropologist Matsui (2011) portrays vividly. The capital city of Kabul is dependent on foreign assistance and resources.

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are states of the former Soviet Union. Now separate from their twentieth-century legacy, these states do not exercise very much authoritarian power vis-à-vis society. Rather ethnic groups are strong in community development and protection (Dadabaev, 2011).

Let us turn to the Ac type social system. It amounts to ten societies with four subtypes. Let us examine Ac1, Ac2, Ac3, Ac4 one by one.

Ac type: Strong Society – Strong State

Ac1 includes China and South Korea. Lifestyle priorities in China are: health, home, job, medical care, and low crime rates. The life domains greatly appreciated by the materialist factor in China are: housing, standard of living, household income, education, and job. The life domains in the public sector dominance factor in China are: public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, democratic system, and leisure. The life domains readily apparent in the post-materialist factor in China are: friendships, marriage, health, neighbors, family life, and spiritual life.

Lifestyle priorities in South Korea are: health, home, family, job, and income. The life domains heavily favored in the public sector dominance factor in South Korea are: housing, standard of living, household income, health, job, leisure, and spiritual life. The life domains that stand out in the public sector dominance factor in South Korea are: public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The life domains strongly appreciated in the post-materialist factor in South Korea are: friendships, marriage, neighbors, and family life.

The common dominant features of China and South Korea are strong society and strong state. A strong society is defined by individualism and clan organization. Individualism sometimes verges on anarchism in pursuit of wealth and the clan's defense. In contrast, the state recruits and develops privileged elite corps by a sort of meritocracy, within which a strong state apparatus is forged. Hence, a strong society and a strong state (Wright, 2010; Henderson, 1968).

Ac2 includes Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. Lifestyle priorities in Cambodia are: diet, health, home, job, and income. The life domains strongly valued in the materialist factor in Cambodia are: housing, friendships, marriage, standard of living, household income, health, education, job, neighbors, and family life. The life domains appreciated in the public sector dominance factor in Cambodia are: public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system.

Lifestyle priorities in Laos are: health, diet, home, job, and family. The life domains valued in the post-materialist factor in Cambodia are: leisure and spiritual life. The life domains emphasized in the materialist factor in Laos are: housing, standard of living, household income, health, education, job, and family life. The life domains heavily supported in the public sector dominance factor in Laos are: neighbors, public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and spiritual life.

Lifestyle priorities in Myanmar are: health, diet, being devout, home, and job. It is important to note that being devout is highly ranked as a life priority. Myanmar is a strongly Buddhist society. The life domains rated prominently in the post-materialist factor in Laos are: friendships, marriage, and leisure. The life domains heavily preferred in the materialist factor in Myanmar are: housing, friendships, standard of living, household income, health, education, and job. The life domains greatly supported in the public sector dominance factor in Myanmar are: neighbors, public safety, condition of the environment, family life, leisure, and spiritual life. The life domains valued in the post-materialist factor in Myanmar is: marriage (Fave & Knoop, 2012).

Common to Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar is a strong presence of continental Indian in Southeast Asian states. Common to all three systems is the blurred distinction of what is normally regarded as the public and the private. Both co-mingle, serving the daily life of people. Hills, floods, and contesting tribal groups prevent the state from being too heavily intrusive on society. In other words, the state exercises power where the society maintains its hold. An extreme example is the dominant Burman ethnic group of Myanmar who controls the federal state and must cope with armed ethnic minorities (Steinberg, 2009; Taylor & Hlaing, 2005).

The Ac3 type social system includes Bangladesh, India, and Nepal.
Lifestyle priorities in Bangladesh are: health, medical care, low crime rates, being

devout, and home. The life domains that are heavily favored in the materialist factor in Bangladesh are: housing, friendships, standard of living, household income, health, education, and job. The life domains strongly preferred in the public sector dominance factor in Bangladesh area: neighbors, public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The life domains robustly chosen in the post-materialist factor in Bangladesh are: marriage, family life, leisure, and spiritual life.

Lifestyle priorities in India are: health, home, diet, job, and family. The life domains valued in the materialist factor in India are: housing, friendships, marriage, standard of living, household income, health, education, job, and neighbors. The life domains that emerged in the public sector dominance factor in India are: public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The life domains that are valued in the post-materialist factor in India are: family life, leisure, and spiritual life.

Lifestyle priorities in Nepal are: health, diet, job, work, and low crime rate. The life domains that ranked highly in the materialist factor in Nepal are: housing, standard of living, household income, health, education, job, leisure, and spiritual life. The life domains strongly favored in the public sector dominance factor in Nepal are: public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The life domains strongly endorsed in the post-materialist factor in Nepal are: friendship, marriage, neighbors, and family life.

Bangladesh, India, and Nepal have an Indianized state structure of British colonial bureaucratic authoritarianism in which society never yields. In other words, the penetration of the state is shallow. Takashi Inoguchi (2007) reveals, by factor analysis applied to the perception of trust in ten Asian countries, that British colonial legacy looms large, second to the perception of human nature (good vs. evil), and followed by communist systemic influence.

The Ac4 type system includes Mongolia. Lifestyle priorities in Mongolia are: health, home, diet, job, and medical care. The life domains heavily selected in the materialist factor in Mongolia are: standard of living, household income, health, education, job, family life, leisure, and spiritual life. The life domains strongly supported in the public sector dominance factor in Mongolia are: public safety, condition of the environment,

social welfare system, and democratic system. The life domains that receive high ratings in the post-materialist factor in Mongolia are: neighbors, housing, friendships, and marriage. A pronounced feature of the Mongolian system is the absolute importance of family, geography, geology, and climate along with its neighbors, Russia and China. The state comes in to sustain lives (Humphrey & Sneath, 1999).

The B type system has five societies: Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Kyrgyzstan. Lifestyle priorities in Hong Kong are: not available as they have not been measured.

The life domains heavily favored in the post-materialist factor in Hong Kong are: friendships, marriage, health, education, family life, leisure, and spiritual life. The life domains in the materialist factor in Hong Kong are: housing, standard of living, household income, and job. The life domains that emerged in the public sector dominant factor in Hong Kong are: neighbors, public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system.

Lifestyle priorities in Malaysia are: health, home, diet, family, and job. The life domains highly endorsed in the post-materialist factor in Malaysia are: friendships, marriage, neighbors, family life, leisure, and spiritual life. The life domains that are greatly valued in the materialist factor in Malaysia are: housing, standard of living, household income, health, education, and job. The life domains heavily favored in the public sector dominant factor in Malaysia are: public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system.

Lifestyle priorities in Thailand are: health, diet, home, job, and family. The life domains highly endorsed in the post-materialist factor in Thailand are: housing, friendships, marriage, neighbors, family life, leisure, and spiritual life. The life domains valued in the public sector dominance factor in Thailand are: standard of living, household income, health, education, and job. The life domains strongly rated in the public sector dominant factor in Thailand are: public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system.

Lifestyle priorities in Vietnam are: health, job, diet, home, and work. The life domains frequently selected in the post-materialist factor in Vietnam are: friendships, marriage, education, family life, leisure, and spiritual life. The life domains widely supported in

the materialist factor in Vietnam are: housing, standard of living, household income, health, and job. The life domains valued in the public sector dominance factor in Vietnam are: neighbors, public safety, condition of the environment, and social welfare system.

A common quality among Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam is that all four places are more or less havens for new settlers where competition and coexistence must be well handled among near-strangers. Post-materialist features are salient and materialist features are just as strong. However, state power is receding. A Vietnamese proverb aptly depicts the situation: state power is up to the bamboo gate (Woodside, 2006). The proverb is especially suitable for northern Vietnam, but is not necessarily applicable to central and southern Vietnam, where state power has limited penetration of the markets of settlers and strangers.

Ca type: Societies where post-materialist features are dominant; include Brunei, the Philippines, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Kazakhstan. Lifestyle priorities in Brunei are: health, home, diet, family, and job. Lifestyle priorities in Bhutan are: health, home, diet, job, and workplace success. The life domains emphasized in the public sector dominant factor in Brunei are: job, neighbors, public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, family life, and leisure. The valued life domains in the materialist factor in Brunei are: standard of living, household income, health, and education. The important life domains in the post-materialist factor in Brunei are: education, friendships, and marriage.

Lifestyle priorities in the Philippines are: diet, health, home, job, and family. The life domains appreciated in the public sector dominant factor in the Philippines are: public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The life domains heavily esteemed in the materialist factor in the Philippines are: housing, standard of living, household income, health, education, and job. The life domains valued in the post-materialist factor in the Philippines are: friendships, marriage, neighbors, family life, leisure, and spiritual life.

Lifestyle priorities in Pakistan are: health, diet, home, being devout, and income. The leading life domains in the public sector dominant factor in Pakistan are: public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The life domains prominent in the materialist factor in Pakistan are: housing, friendships,

standard of living, household income, health, education, and job. The life domains valued in the post-materialist factor in Pakistan are: marriage, neighbors, family life, leisure, and spiritual life.

Lifestyle priorities in Sri Lanka are: health, diet, home, family, and job. The life domains most cherished in the public sector dominant factor in Sri Lanka are: public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The life domains deemed important in the post-materialist factor in Sri Lanka are: housing, friendships, standard of living, household income, health, education, and job. The life domains valued most in the materialist factor in Sri Lanka are: marriage, neighbors, family life, and spiritual life.

Lifestyle priorities in Kazakhstan are: health, job, home, medical care, and income. The life domains most appreciated in the public sector dominant factor in Kazakhstan are: public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The life domains most important in the materialist factor in Kazakhstan are: housing, standard of living, household income, health, and job. The life domains strongly valued in the post-materialist factor in Kazakhstan are: friendship, marriage, education neighbors, family life leisure, and spiritual life.

A common feature of Brunei, the Philippines, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Kazakhstan is the domineering behavior of state. However, in each country it is a weak state domineering among a centrifugal society, with each component of society asserting itself sporadically. Pakistan represents a dominating state and a strong society, which has prompted one of the authors of this volume to titled his book, *Pakistan* (Lieven, 2012).

The Cb type system includes Singapore and the Maldives.

Lifestyle priorities in Singapore are: health, home, job, family, and diet. The valued life domains in the public sector dominant factor in Singapore are: public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The life domains heavily favored in the post-materialist factor in Singapore are: housing, marriage, neighbors, family life, leisure, and spiritual life. The life domains strongly appreciated in the materialist factor in Singapore are: standard of living, household income, health, education, and job.

Lifestyle priorities in the Maldives are: diet, medical care, low crime rates, health, and job. The life domains most selected in the public sector dominant factor in the Maldives are: standard of living, household income, health, education, job, neighbors, public safety, condition f the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The life domain valued in the materialist factor in the Maldives is: family life. The life domains most appreciated in the post-materialist factor in the Maldives are: housing, friendships, and marriage.

A common feature to Singapore and the Maldives is that the state is really dominant. The society is seemingly compliant and docile. However, outside the framework of regulation and imposition by the state, society is more vibrant in Singapore (Koh & Ling, 2000).

5. Conclusion

Guided by the notion of multiple modes of well-being, I have constructed a typology of societies based on life priorities. The strength of this method is that it is evidence-based in that each respondent's responses to life priorities are nationally aggregated by factor analysis with varimax rotation and that the combination of two of the three large factors, materialism, post-materialism and public sector dominance, enables me to have eight society types in Asia as summarized below:

Table 1.
Society Typology through Life Aspect Priorities from Bottom (Factor Dimensions after Varimax Rotation)

Ab type	materialism followed by post-materialism
	weak state/strong society
	Japan, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan
Ac type	materialism followed by public sector dominance
	strong society/strong state
Ac1	China, South Korea (East Asia)
Ac2	Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Southeast Asia)
Ac3	Bangladesh, India, Nepal (South Asia)
Ac4	Mongolia (Central Asia)

B type post-materialism followed by materialism
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Kyrgyzstan

Ca type Brunei, the Philippines, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan
post-materialism followed by public sector dominance

Cb type public sector dominance followed by materialism
Singapore, the Maldives

The definitions of materialism, post-materialism, and public sector dominance are in other words, quality-of-life-sustaining, quality-of-life-enriching, and quality-of-life-enabling factors. They are somewhat different from those used by Inglehart. However, our use of these concepts are more encompassing of various life priorities and thus more widely and universally applicable. Our deliberations of these concepts are more systematically evidence-based. I have also examined a large body of literature concerning typology of societies, especially in relation to the state. Although my examination was not done systematically and thoroughly for all 27 societies in Asia in this article, it is safe to say that basic validity of my proposed typology is justified.

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