

How Class Matters in Four Chinese Societies: Social Inequality and Political Attitudes

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1. Introduction: Chinese Exceptionalism?

In most social scientific studies, class is a fundamental variable explaining social inequality and political changes (Lipset 1959; Wright 1985). In the process of industrialization, people's class location to a large extent determines their income level and life chances (Wright and Singelmann 1982; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). Nevertheless, classes were usually taken as the major political actors in the process of democratization or social revolution (Moore 1966; Przeworski 1985). Therefore, class politics, especially the political attitudes of the middle classes, are usually used to test the statements derived from the modernization or Marxist theories (Wright 1997). However, by claiming the significance of Confucianism, some politicians and early Chinese social studies doubt the "class-matters" assumption (Pinches 1999). We called the skeptics "Chinese Exceptionalism".

In this article we use the pooled dataset from the AsiaBarometer survey 2006 to investigate the class inequality and political attitudes in the four Chinese societies—Urban China, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. Applying the class typology developed by Erik Olin Wright (1985), we divided the interviewees from the pooled dataset into six class locations and defined the working class and new middle classes in the Chinese societies. We used the objective income level and subjective

life satisfaction to measure social inequality. Also, by using the factor analysis, some indicators are constructed to measure the attitude toward democracy (or conversely, anti-authoritarian attitude). The results of the statistics showed that classes shaped social inequality and political attitudes in Chinese societies. The empirical evidence suggests that the “Chinese Exceptionalism” shall be more problematic than the conventional industrialization theory.

2. Conventional Wisdom VS. Chinese Exceptionalism

In most advanced capitalist societies, social class explained the unequal income distribution and voting behaviors until the period of de-industrialization (Clark and Lipset 1991). Some scholars doubt the explanatory power of the variable in Chinese societies, however (Redding 1990). We name the two camps “Conventional Industrialism” and “Chinese Exceptionalism.”

Concluding from the historical experiences of advanced capitalist countries, the Conventional Industrialism recognized that class inequality and class politics influenced the great transformation in the Western world (Marx 1977; Polanyi 1957). The theory argued that the capitalist development produced not only the bourgeoisie but also the urban lower classes, especially the working class (Marx and Engels 1969). The capitalist class difference is one of the major sources of income inequality during industrialization (Kuznets 1966). Moreover, the deteriorating class inequality might stimulate social conflicts and class formation (Thompson 1963).

Although Marx’s own aspects of democracy are usually contradictory, he tends to argue that the liberal democracy is subordinated to the interests of the capitalist class (Carnoy 1984). Democratization might empower the property owners and then

improve the protection of property rights. The aspect inspires the historical comparative study of Barrington Moore, who states that “no bourgeoisie, no democracy (Moore 1966: 414).” Following the argument of Marx and Moore, the political modernization theory assumed that bourgeoisie and middle classes are the pro-democratic force in the most industrial societies (Lipset 1959, 1980; Przeworski 1985; Rostow 1960). It also applied to the political transition of the New Industrial Countries (NICS) in East Asia (Hsiao and Koo 1997).

The Conventional Industrialism takes the social class as an important variable influenced the income distribution and political preference of its members. To simplify the complex theoretical and historical contexts, we summarize the theory into four statements associated with class inequality and class politics:

H1a: income inequality: class locations determine the unequal income distribution in Chinese industrial societies.

H1b: the objective income difference shapes Chinese people’s understanding of their subjective living standard and satisfaction.

H1c: Political modernization theory (class politics): capitalist development generates a large proportion of working class and new middle classes, and the new middle classes prefer democracy.

H1d: Also, middle classes are more likely to participate in social movements.

Based on arguing that the “Eastern/Confucian” culture departed from the “Western” culture, Chinese Exceptionalism challenges the hypothesis derived from the

conventional theory. Although the class inequality exists in most industrial societies, the exceptionalists claim that because of the cultural differences between the “East” and “West,” class does not matter that much on the Chinese subjective life satisfaction. Because the Chinese culture is in favor of the collective values rather than individual interests, economic development may not trigger the middle class’s preference of democracy and participation of social movements (a critical summary, see Pinches [1999]). As a result, the new middle classes might contribute to the political stability of Chinese societies. We simplify the counterparts of the exceptionalist hypotheses:

H2a: although class inequality exists, it does not significantly influence people’s subjective satisfaction and their understanding of relative living standard in Chinese societies.

H2b: even though capitalist development generates the working class and middle classes in Chinese societies, the new middle classes prefer stable authoritarianism rather than democracy.

H2c: departed from the class struggles in the “West,” Chinese middle classes and working class are less likely to participate in social movements.

The Chinese Exceptionalism, to some extent, can be taken as the null hypotheses of the Conventional Industrialism. It should be noticed that the two contradictory camps are empirically measurable, testable and falsifiable. However, there is an alternative in explaining the H2b and H2c even though the H1c and H1d are tentative. As Hsiao (1989) argued, the new middle classes in East Asia may far from mature. The new middle classes are the first generation, affluent, ascending, fragmented, and culturally

diverse. It is possible that the “five proposition” of middle classes still works. We put the hypotheses of the immature middle classes as:

H3a: because of the late development of Chinese societies, the formation of working class and middle classes is far from complete; the latter is only slightly in favor of democracy and a little more likely to participate in social movements.

3. Data and Measurement

3.1 Sources of Dataset

We used the AsiaBarometer survey conducted in 2006 to investigate the relationship between class structure, income inequality, political attitude and social participation in Chinese societies. Developing by the Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo, AsiaBarometer was a leading social and political survey in Asia. A pooled sample from the four Chinese societies—Hong Kong (N=998), Singapore (N=1,030), Taiwan (N=971), and urban China (1,730) in the dataset are applied to fit the following class schema and the statistical models.

3.2 Neo-Marxian Class Typology

To investigate how class matters in a society, first of all, we need a class schema or typology to categorize our samples. Class schema itself is a debatable field, however. For several practical advantages we choose Wright’s early neo-Marxist typology, namely the “Wright-I” or the “power” model. Theoretically, the typology clearly defined the old middle class (self-employed), new middle classes (small employer, semi-autonomous worker, and manager) and the working class. Although the

definition of class locations is imperfect, for our theoretical purpose, it is better than the neo-Weberian schema, which mixed the capitalists, small owners and new middle classes with the “high controllers” and “low controllers” (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). Empirically, the class typology matches the occupational coding better than the neo-Weberian schema and the “exploitation (Wright-II) model” (Wright 1997), which need the measurement of authority and skill level to define locations. Moreover, it has been proved that the power model performs better than the others in predicting people’s income in the recent European Social Survey (Leiulfsrud, Bison and Jensberg, 2005). Therefore, the neo-Marxist “power” model is sufficient for our purpose to test the hypotheses derived from the “Chinese Exceptionalism” and conventional theory.

Figure 1 shows our empirical categorization from the AsiaBarometer’s dataset based on the neo-Marxist “power” model. The model divided samples into six categories—capitalist, small employer, self-employed, manager, semi-autonomous employee, and worker. According to the survey’s occupational proxies, we use employed more than 30 people as the standard separating the capitalist from the small employer. In the employees we use the category “semi-autonomous employee” to combine the skilled workers and professionals (including self-employed professionals). Following the original neo-Marxist class theory, the three categories—small employer, manager and semi-autonomous employee—between the capitalist, worker and self-employed are defined as the “contradictory class locations,” and the manager and semi-autonomous employee are recognized as the “new middle classes.” As the earlier comparative studies show (Wright 1997), it makes sense to expect that the income level and subjective satisfaction go after the sequence from the capitalist on the top, following by the new middle classes, old

middle classes, to the working class on the bottom.

[Figure 1 about Here]

For testing the hypotheses derived from the Chinese Exceptionalism, we take four Chinese societies into account. All the samples from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are divided by the neo-Marxist class typology. It should be noticed that in China's reality, there are still about half of population live in the rural areas (Lin and Wu 2009). Because of the rural-urban boundary sustained by the Household Registration (Hukou) system, the living standard and live styles are very different between the Chinese urban and the rural population (Whyte 2010). The urban-rural difference may also reflect on the political attitudes. For the empirical concern of comparability, in the case of China we only use the urban samples.

3.3 Variation of Class Structure

Table 1 displays the results of the distribution of the six class locations and the non-workforce in the four Chinese societies. The percentages of the non-workforce (about 33.3%) are similar across the four places. Paralleling to the other capitalist countries, the working class location are still the greatest part in the four industrial societies. However, the proportions of the other class locations vary.

[Table 1 about Here]

According to the results, the four Chinese societies have quit different class structures. Comparing to each other, Taiwan has the largest proportion of small employer (5.66%), followed by the proportion of the same category in China (5.43%). Singapore has a huge service sector and the greatest proportion of professional (21.17%), followed by the proportion of the category of Urban China (11.1%) and Hong Kong (10.28%). Urban China has the greatest percentage of self-employed

(11.68%), followed by the percentage of the same category of Taiwan (7.31%). In the four Chinese societies, why the class structures vary like this?

The variation of class structures may come from the different reality or from some measurement errors. First, the varieties of class structure in the four societies may be explained by the strategies and experiences of industrial development rather than by the similar Chinese cultural background. Despite of the same rapid economic growth rate, scholars of Asian economic development have paid attention to the different experiences of industrialization in these Chinese societies (Vogal 1991; Wade 1990; Haggard 1990). The manufacturing sector, especially the export-oriented industries in Taiwan has long been dominated by the middle and small scale enterprises. In contrast, the large scale land developers played very important role in shaping Hong Kong's economy. Departed from Taiwan's industrial structure, the manufacturing sector in Korea is dominated by the large scale business groups (Amsden 1989). Comparing to Taiwan and Korea, the development trajectory of Singapore may be in between (Haggard 1990). Singapore society may contain higher percentage of professional and skilled workers in the large scale groups especially in the service sector. At last, as a growing economy, some small entrepreneurs called *getihu* may be still active in the urban China (Wu and Xie 2003). Hence, the varied class structures in the different places looks like reasonable.

Despite of the real structural differences, the results of our categorization also imply several methodological issues. First of all, in the AsiaBarometer survey, the selective occupations in the questionnaire are not mutually exclusive and exhaustible. For example, the category "senior manager" may include samples of the other category "business owner or manager of an organization with over 30 employees" in the same company. However, the owner is not included in the later. Second, the

variation may come from the diverse meanings of the occupational categories in different social contexts. The higher percentage of urban China's "semi-autonomous employee" than the percentages in Hong Kong and Taiwan, for example, may derive from the different uses of Chinese occupational titles. Nevertheless, the sample may be biased by different sources in the four societies. In the case of Taiwan, for example, the proportions of capitalist and manager only contain 0.2% and 0.3% in the AsiaBarometer dataset, which is much lower than the other survey or official datasets (Lin 2009). In the urban China sample, the proportion of the employment in the public sector (state-owned enterprises or collectives) may be overestimated (Lin 2008; Lin and Wu 2009). When we explain the varieties of different countries, we should keep these possibilities of errors in our minds.

The methodological issues also lead to some statistical problems. In the six class locations, we find that some numbers of cases are too few to regress. There are four locations contained less than 1% and five locations contains less than 2% of the total employment in the four countries. In these categories, a few cases may bias the whole statistical results. Therefore, we turn to use the pooled dataset of the four places. For controlling the different social and economic conditions, we input some macro-level variables, such as GDP per capita and Gini coefficient of each society. The sources of our revised dataset, please see Table 2.

[Table 2 about Here]

3.4 Measuring Living Standard

The first set of the dependent variables is those measuring social inequality. We take four constructed variables to measure the perception of social inequality. The first variable is the household income level. Although the survey offered the original

number of household income by different currencies, it is still very difficult to calculate the real purchasing power by the US dollar or by the other standards. Following the suggestion of the survey conductors, we use the three categories, “high=3, middle=2, and lower=1,” to recode the relative income levels.

The second variable is the subjective life satisfaction. We take five questions in the survey to construct a variable by the factor analysis. The questions are “How often do you feel you are really enjoying life these days?(Q5)” “How much do you feel you are accomplishing what you want out of your life? (Q6)” and “Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with the following aspects of your life (Q7).” In the last sub items of the last question we only take housing, standard of living and household income into account. The factor analysis, to a large extent, reflected the subjective understanding of life satisfaction of the interviewee.

The third variable is the self-evaluation of living standard, a 5-likert scale from low to high, without any manipulation. Besides, we pick the perception of economic risk as the last variable measuring social inequality. The question “Which, if any, of the following issues cause you great worry?” is considered. Five sub-items, “fair world trade,” “globalization,” “economic problems in your country,” “global recession” and “unemployment” are applied to construct the factor to indicate the interviewee’s perception of economic risks. If the interviewee is more worried about these items, he or she has higher sensitivity of the global economic hazards.

3.5 Measuring Political Attitude

Two set of variables are used to construct the measurement of political attitudes. The first variable is constructed from the question “Please indicate for each system whether you think it would be very good, fairly good or bad (likert scale 1-3) for this

country.” Four sub-items, “Governance by a powerful leader without the restriction of parliament or elections,” “A system whereby decisions affecting the country are made by experts,” “Military government,” and “A democratic political system (Inverted the original likert scale 1-3)” are taken into account in the factor analysis. The higher degree of the factor, the stronger resistance of the authoritarianism is by the interviewee. On the other hand, according to the question about the participation of social movement, such as “Signing a petition to improve conditions,” “Joining in boycotts,” and “Attending lawful demonstrations,” we constructed the last variable by factor analysis to measure the degree of activism of the different class locations in the four Chinese societies.

Despite of the six class locations as the key variables in the models, several variables about basic information, such as education (middle and high), gender, age and age-square are inputted into the model for the purpose of control. Moreover, the GDP per capita and its square are used to control the standard of economic development; the Gini coefficient is used to estimate the impact of income inequality in general. The sources of the additional macro-level variables are the Penn World Table Version 6.3 and World Income Inequality Database. The summary of descriptive statistics, please see Table 3. The correlation matrix of the major variables please refers to Table 4. For those who are interested in the making of the factor analyses, please refer to the Appendix Table 1.

[Table 3 and Table 4 about Here]

4. Method and Results

The pooled dataset is directly used to investigate the class effect on the dependent variables. The Weighted Least Square (WLS) regression model to adjust the

heteroskedasticity implied in the four groups. The major reason of the choice is technical: if we use only the single sample from one of the four societies, there would be only a few cases in some class locations and lead to statistical insignificance. Because all the dependent variables are linear, we use the WLS regression on estimating the relative income level, subjective life satisfaction, subjective living standard, global economic risk, anti-authoritarian attitude, and the tendency participating in social protests. The results are displayed on Table 5 and Table 6.

4.1 Social Classes and Living Standard

The outcomes on Table 5 showed that class inequality clearly reflected on both objective and subjective life standard variables. On the model of relative income level, it can be find that according to the coefficients the capitalist and the manager earned much more than the worker and the self-employed, who are the bottom of the four urbanized Chinese societies. As the expectation of the neo-Marxist class analysis, the income level of the small employer and the semi-autonomous employee are in the middle. Although not as significant as the model of objective household income level (adjusted R-square=0.235), the results of the models of subjective life satisfaction and subjective living standard follow the same sequence among the six class locations. Figure 2 displays the predicted value of the models. Obviously, it illustrates the correlation between the 1-3 scale income level and the 1-5 living standards in all the six class locations. The results confirm the hypothesis H1a: class matters for the income distribution and subjective feeling of social inequality.

[Table 5 and Figure 2 about Here]

Interestingly, the results of the perception of economic risk are to a large extent conversed the sequence of the income level. The manager, self-employed and the

workers worried about economic hazard much more than the other classes.

Unfortunately, the fitness of the model is not good enough (adjusted R-square=0.11).

The findings about people's perception of risk shall be further investigated.

4.2 Social Classes and Political Attitude

On Table 6, the coefficients in the models of anti-authoritarian attitude and participating in social protest are to a large extent departed. According to the estimation of the degree of anti-authoritarian attitude, the capitalist as well as small employers followed by the workers are the pro-democratic force. In contrast, according to the estimation on the degree of participating social protests, the self-employed and semi-autonomous employees show much stronger potential to raise a petition or go to the streets. However, as Figure 3 demonstrates, the political attitude and collective behavior are inconsistent among classes. The coefficient of higher education is the only variable consistent: high education lead to higher degrees of democratic attitude and participation of social protests.

[Table 6 and Figure 3 about Here]

Although the results do not contradict to the prediction of H1b, the models about the preference of democratic attitude and participation in social movements are inconstant and largely insignificant. The coefficients do not support the Chinese Exceptionalism, but neither do they strongly sustain the Conventional Industrialism. The mixed outcome implies that the five propositions of the middle classes may still work in the four Chinese societies (Hsiao and So 1999).

5. Conclusion and Discussion

In this article we test the hypotheses derived from the Chinese Exceptionalism and Conventional Industrialism. Following the historical experiences of the advanced capitalist societies, the Industrialism claims that in the transition to capitalism, the class structure shaped social inequality and the political attitudes. The class structure to a large extent determined the unequal income distribution and the subjective perception of life conditions. In the capitalist development, the components of class structure gradually dominated by the working class and the middle classes. For enforcing the protection of private property rights and citizenship, the emergent bourgeoisie and new middle classes preferred a more liberal democratic regime. On the other hand, the expanding middle classes and the working class are supposed to be the driving force of social movements.

In contrast, the Chinese Exceptionalism claims that, under the Confucianism the Chinese societies may not follow the rules of industrialization and modernization. Even though the class inequality exists, the Chinese may not associate the inequality with the subjective life satisfaction and happiness, which is supposed to be the foundation of relative deprivation. If the class inequality does not irritate subjective feeling of deprivation, the class structure may not associate with the interests and political preference of the members in the class locations. If the class consciousness is unclear, the changing class structure may be irrelevant to the political modernization.

We used the pooled data from the samples of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and urban China in the AsiaBarometer survey to investigate the contradictory hypotheses of the two camps. Our findings tentatively support the Conventional Industrialism. The regression models displayed that in the four Chinese societies, people obviously recognized the objective class inequality, and the objective class inequality is robustly correlated the subjective life satisfaction and relative living standard. Also, the economic inequality shaped people's perception on the distribution

of the global economic risks. However, the association between the class inequality and class politics is not so straightforward. In the model about political attitude we find that the bourgeoisie and new middle classes tend to hold an anti-authoritarian attitude. In the participation of social protests, the self-employed and higher educated are much more radical than the others. The mixed results of the middle class's political attitudes may be explained by the five propositions (Hsiao 1989). Although some coefficients are insignificant in our models, the directions of them confirm the conventional wisdom rather than the Chinese Exceptionalism.

It should be noticed that there are some methodological issues implied in our models. The occupational categories in the AsiaBarometer survey may not be precise and consistent in the four societies. It may distort the class structure in our sample. Despite of the technical problem, the variety of class structure in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and urban China still match our understanding of the different industrial structure discovered in the literatures.

The Chinese Exceptionalism, instead of a scientific statement, is a conservative political ideology generated from the Chinese authoritarian regimes (Zakaria 1994). The official propaganda, such as "harmonious society," may be a new edition of the Chinese Exceptionalism. However, it can hardly explain the rising political instability in China. It is also difficult to explain the political dichotomy between Taiwan and the other Chinese societies. The empirical evidences from the social survey remind us that the conventional wisdom from the "West" is still valuable for our understanding of the development in the Chinese modern societies.

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


Figure 1. The Neo-Marxist Class Typology and Proxies in AsiaBarometer 2006

Table 1 The Class Structure of Survey Respondents in Chinese Societies

Country Wright	Urban China	Hong Kong	Singapore	Taiwan	Total
Non-workforce	32.83	35.97	31.36	33.47	33.31
Capitalist	1.33	0.6	1.36	0.21	0.95
Small employer	5.43	2.81	0.29	5.66	3.81
Self-employed	11.68	0.3	1.07	7.31	6.07
Semi-autonomous employee	11.1	4.71	21.17	2.99	10.28
Manager	2.6	1.6	1.84	0.31	1.76
Worker	35.03	54.01	42.91	50.05	43.84
Total (number of observations)	100 (1,730)	100 (998)	100 (1,030)	100 (971)	100 (4,729)

Notes : Brackets are the percentage of profession in the country.

Table 2 Description of Variables and Data Sources

Variables	Variable Description	Source
Income level (F8)	Question number F8 of Asia Barometer Survey (1=low income; 2=middle income; 3=high income)	Asia Barometer 2006
Life satisfaction (Q5-7)	Question number Q5, Q6, and Q7 of Asia Barometer Survey	Asia Barometer 2006
Subjective living standard (Q8)	Question number Q8 of Asia Barometer Survey	Asia Barometer 2006
Perception of global economic risk (Q25)	Question number Q25_3, Q25_9, Q25_11, Q25_12, and Q25_19 of Asia Barometer Survey	Asia Barometer 2006
Anti-authoritarianism(Q38)	Question number Q38 of Asia Barometer Survey	Asia Barometer 2006
Participation of social protest (Q47)	Question number Q47 of Asia Barometer Survey	Asia Barometer 2006
GDP pc 2006	GDP per capita in 2006(1\$; 2005 Constant Prices)	Penn World Table Version 6.3
Gini 2006	Gini coefficient in 2006	World Income Inequality Database 2C (Hong Kong and Singapore), Government Statistics (Taiwan and Urban China)
Education (middle)	the level of education are low, middle, and high; separated by question number F3 of Asia Barometer Survey	Asia Barometer 2006
Education (high)	the level of education are low, middle, and high; separated by question number F3 of Asia Barometer Survey	Asia Barometer 2006
Female	Question number F1 of Asia Barometer Survey (0=Male ; 1=Female)	Asia Barometer 2006
Age	Question number F2 of Asia Barometer Survey	Asia Barometer 2006

Table 3 Summary of Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Number of observations	Mean (All)	Mean (Taiwan)	Mean (Urban China)	Mean (Hong Kong)	Mean (Singapore)	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
<u>Dependent variables</u>									
Income level (F8)	4607	1.77	1.95	1.53	1.69	2.07	0.76	1	3
Life satisfaction (Q5-7)	4677	-0.01	-0.09	-0.19	-0.17	0.54	0.87	-3.14	2.08
Subjective living standard (Q8)	4727	3.01	3.01	2.86	3.02	3.23	0.64	1	5
Perception of economic risk (Q25)	4732	0.05	0.28	-0.23	0.08	0.25	0.68	-0.58	2.87
Anti-authoritarianism(Q38)	4308	0.03	0.02	-0.13	0.14	0.21	0.55	-2.01	0.82
Participation of social protest (Q47)	4067	-0.05	-0.38	0.38	0.12	-0.48	0.80	-0.78	2.57
<u>Micro-level control variables</u>									
Education (middle)	4730	0.32	0.40	0.26	0.42	0.24	0.47	0	1
Education (high)	4730	0.24	0.29	0.30	0.16	0.18	0.43	0	1
Female	4732	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.52	0.54	0.50	0	1
Age	4732	40.49	40.15	40.13	40.92	40.97	12.45	20	69
<u>Macro-level control variables</u>									
GDPpc (per capita) 2006	4732	25413.21	25640.16	7132.93	40592.56	41150.53	14996.06	7132.93	41150.53
Gini 2006	4732	45.52	33.90	46.01	53.30	48.10	6.48	33.90	53.30

Table 4 Correlation Coefficient Matrix

	Income level	Life satisfaction	Living standard	Economic risk	Anti-authoritarianism	Social protest
Macro-level						
GDPpc 2006	0.2148*	0.1965*	0.1828*	0.2605*	0.2432*	-0.2867*
Gini_2006	-0.0902*	0.0344*	0.0245	-0.0975*	0.0732*	0.1880*
Social class						
Capitalist	0.0841*	0.0394*	0.0469*	0.0093	0.0287	0.0033
Small employer	0.0720*	0.0124	0.0222	-0.0176	-0.0024	0.014
Self-employed	-0.0883*	-0.0708*	-0.0573*	-0.0273	-0.0712*	0.0794*
Semi-autonomous employee	0.2089*	0.1486*	0.1135*	0.0001	0.0229	0.0574*
Manager	0.1397*	0.0631*	0.0644*	0.011	0.0166	0.0425*
Worker	0.0114	-0.0718*	-0.0241	0.0781*	0.0408*	-0.0141
Control variables						
Education (middle)	0.0372*	-0.0152	0.0113	0.0613*	0.0038	0.0219
Education (high)	0.2605*	0.0947*	0.1401*	-0.021	0.0082	0.1379*
Female	-0.0473*	0.0192	-0.0111	-0.0328*	-0.0075	-0.0838*
Age	-0.0805*	0.0622*	-0.0408*	-0.0463*	0.0410*	-0.0850*

Notes : * p<0.05 ◦

Table 5 Estimates (1)

	Income level	Life satisfaction	Living standard
Macro-variables			
GDP pc 2006	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0003*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)
GDP pc 2006 square	0.0000*** (0.0000)	0.0000*** (0.0000)	0.0000*** (0.0000)
Gini 2006	-0.0582*** (0.0050)	-0.1114*** (0.0059)	-0.0324*** (0.0045)
Social classes			
Capitalist	0.7339*** (0.1052)	0.2761* (0.1251)	0.2578** (0.0935)
Small employer	0.5322*** (0.0544)	0.2274*** (0.0659)	0.1755*** (0.0492)
Self-employed	0.1028* (0.0452)	-0.0240 (0.0549)	0.0174 (0.0413)
Semi-autonomous employee	0.4080*** (0.0401)	0.1609*** (0.0483)	0.0878* (0.0363)
Manager	0.8284*** (0.0784)	0.3282*** (0.0947)	0.2419*** (0.0711)
Worker	0.1562*** (0.0253)	-0.0288 (0.0304)	-0.0047 (0.0228)
Control variables			
Education (middle)	0.2417*** (0.0249)	0.1984*** (0.0301)	0.1271*** (0.0226)
Education (high)	0.5241*** (0.0299)	0.3569*** (0.0363)	0.2836*** (0.0272)
Female	0.0382+ (0.0206)	0.0656** (0.0249)	0.0163 (0.0187)
Age	0.0012 (0.0053)	0.0025 (0.0064)	0.0042 (0.0048)
Age squared	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)
Constant	4.2158*** (0.3197)	6.0870*** (0.3807)	4.4954*** (0.2862)
Number of observations	4603	4673	4722
R-sq	0.237	0.154	0.087
Adj. R-sq	0.235	0.152	0.084

Notes : Brackets are standard errors ; Significance level : + p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 °




Figure 2 Social Classes and Income Level/Living Standard in Chinese Societies

Table 6 Estimates (2)

	Global economic risk	Anti-authoritarianism	Social protest
Macro-variables			
GDP pc 2006	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000* (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)
GDP pc 2006 square	0.0000* (0.0000)	0.0000** (0.0000)	-0.0000*** (0.0000)
Gini 2006	-0.0300*** (0.0047)	-0.0116** (0.0042)	0.0990*** (0.0053)
Social classes			
Capitalist	0.1572 (0.0993)	0.2087* (0.0860)	-0.1156 (0.1159)
Small employer	0.0437 (0.0521)	0.0997* (0.0447)	-0.0446 (0.0624)
Self-employed	0.0921* (0.0438)	-0.0003 (0.0375)	0.1353** (0.0523)
Semi-autonomous employee	0.0369 (0.0385)	0.0260 (0.0329)	0.0862+ (0.0452)
Manager	0.1820* (0.0756)	0.1076+ (0.0647)	0.0185 (0.0890)
Worker	0.0650** (0.0243)	0.0537* (0.0211)	0.0130 (0.0284)
Control variables			
Education (middle)	0.0314 (0.0240)	0.0236 (0.0208)	0.1272*** (0.0281)
Education (high)	-0.0133 (0.0289)	0.0765** (0.0249)	0.2369*** (0.0342)
Female	-0.0293 (0.0199)	0.0140 (0.0172)	-0.1132*** (0.0232)
Age	0.0008 (0.0051)	-0.0020 (0.0045)	0.0101+ (0.0061)
Age squared	-0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001+ (0.0001)
Constant	1.1926*** (0.3040)	0.4419 (0.2693)	-5.2447*** (0.3448)
Number of observations	4727	4303	4063
R-sq	0.111	0.069	0.232
Adj. R-sq	0.109	0.066	0.229

Notes : Brackets are standard errors ; Significance level : + p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 ◦




Figure 3 Social Classes and Political Attitude in Chinese Societies

Appendix Table 1 Questions Used to Construct Measurements

No.	Components of the Social Indicator
Income level	
F8	What was the total gross annual income of your household last year? Interviewees of each country are divided into three groups, “high=3”, “middle=2” and “low=1”, as the AsiaBarometer suggested.
Life satisfaction: factor analysis of the following items	
Q5	How often do you feel you are really enjoying life these days?(Inverted the original likert scale1-4)
Q6	How much do you feel you are accomplishing what you want out of your life? (Inverted the original likert scale1-4)
Q7	Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with the following aspects of your life.
a	Housing (Inverted the original likert scale1-5)
d	Standard of living (Inverted the original likert scale1-5)
e	Household income (Inverted the original likert scale1-5) “+” means the higher degree of satisfaction
Subjective living standard	
Q8	How would you describe your standard of living? (Inverted original likert scale1-5, from Low to High) “+” means the higher degree of subjective living standard
Perception of global economic risk: factor analysis of the following items	
Q25	Which, if any, of the following issues cause you great worry? (Worry=1)
3	Fair world trade
9	Globalization of human economic activities
11	Economic problems in your country
12	Global recession
19	Unemployment “+” means the higher degree of worrying
Anti-authoritarianism: factor analysis of the following items	
Q38	Please indicate for each system whether you think it would be very good, fairly good or bad (likert scale 1-3) for this country:
a	Governance by a powerful leader without the restriction of parliament or elections
b	A system whereby decisions affecting the country are made by experts...
c	Military government
d	A democratic political system (Inverted the original likert scale1-3) “+” means the higher degree of anti-authoritarianism or pro-democracy
Participation of social protest: factor analysis of the following items	
Q47	...whether you have actually done..., whether you might do or would never, under any circumstance, do it. (Recoded have done=3, might do=2, never=1)
a	Signing a petition to improve conditions
b	Joining in boycotts
c	Attending lawful demonstrations