Family Structure, Family Function and Child-rearing Value in China and India[1]

(preliminary draft)

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Introduction and analytical methods

In this paper, we try to compare the Hindu and Chinese families in several dimensions, including family structure, family function, and some relevant family values. These dimensions are not isolated from each other but logically inter-related. Change in family function shall cause adjustment in family size and structures. And in the changing structure, family member shall have new perceptions and expectations towards other family members, and accordingly the interaction mode between them and others. People shall adjust their behavior and values to realize family functions under the new family structure.

We shall explore into several questions and offer some explanations accordingly:

——In the present times, is there any difference between India and China in terms of the family size and family structure? Considering those two countries predominantly agrarian societies with joint families, we might be able to see how modernization process has shaped family structures in two countries in different ways.

——Family has its function, and specific structure shall help the family to realize its function. Is Hindu family different from Chinese family in its functions, including the economic function, family support system, and child-rearing mode etc.?

——Is the child-rearing value different between India and China towards sons and daughters?

We shall argue in this paper that, India and China are both facing tension from traditional legacy and rapid economic development. The tension is manifested in multiple aspects, including family structure, family function and related child-rearing values. We see a common trend of shrinking family size and increase of the percentage of nuclear family in total households. The traditional prototype of joint family is more rarely seen in both societies, rural or urban. Nevertheless, we find some significant

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divergence between two countries, e.g. inter-generation support within family, residential modes in different life stage, and values of child-rearing. The causes of these differences are still to be further explored.

Before heading into analysis, we feel necessary to clarify some methodological issues.

First of all, to which extent China and India are comparable?

This is an intrinsic difficulty that comparative analysis can hardly avoid. If two countries have profoundly different contexts, e.g., ethnicity, culture, religion, economic situation, political system, comparing one to the other always causes critique. Particularly when researchers try to offer a theoretical explanation, the risk of exposure to criticism usually increases due to the fact that we cannot rule out other factors that might cast effect on the outcomes. Apart from the difficulty of elaborating causal-effect mechanisms, it is also not easy to draw conclusion based on the complex phenomenon. We might run the risk of over-simplification based on the inadequate information. The more information we obtain, more difficult for us to draw a conclusion.

Our way of dealing with it is to control some variables in the modeling to highlight the relationship between variables of our interest. In descriptive analysis, we shall refer to other empirical studies to assist us in analyzing the questions. Most importantly, we hope to propose some interesting propositions rather than arbitrarily draw any conclusions. These propositions might be the starting point for further study.

The second issue is the merge of different waves of data.

This study mainly use the integrated Asia Barometer 2003-2008 survey data. The Asia Barometer Survey is conducted by the Research and Information Center for Asian Studies, Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia & Graduate School of Interdisciplinary Information Studies, The University of Tokyo. The data set including the survey data in 32 countries from year 2003 to 2008. In China, four waves of survey have been taken, respectively in year 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2008; in India, three waves in year 2003, 2005 and 2008. We collapse those waves together so long as the same questions are repeated in that wave. Merging datasets undoubtedly cause some problems of validity, but we assume our merge useful to the final analysis for three reasons: (1) sample size is relatively small in each wave and would cause technical difficulties if we use it separately; (2) to our knowledge, no big events have occurred in two countries during 2003 and 2008 that would tremendously change the social structure and value system, 5 years being a short period of time for dramatic social and value change. Such treatment shall not exaggerate or underestimate the outcomes; (3)some cautious technical methods are adopted to exclude the influence of some rapidly changing factors, e.g. income. We standardize the income level by country and by years, to make the income level feasible for comparison and to rule out the inflation effect which might bias our estimation.

Thirdly, this study has referred to other empirical studies.

Apart from the Asia Barometer dataset, we also refer to other empirical materials concerning Chinese and Hindu economy, society and family, including Indian 2001

Census data and Chinese General Social Survey. Asia Barometer, due to the length constraints, is lacking in some scale and question, and some objective variables are not detailed enough to make precise independent variables, including education level and occupation information. We tentatively use other studies to reach more concrete and convincing argument.

The content of this paper goes as follows:

Part I: Family structures in two countries, including family size and demographic composition, and the different residential patterns in two countries;

Part II: Family functions，including the number of bread-winners, family support system in different social groups；

Part III: Family values, including the gendered expectation towards children.

Part I: Family structure—who are in the family?

"Big Joint family" is a prototype in both Chinese and Hindu societies throughout the long history. In joint family, brothers, married or unmarried, live together in one household headed by their father. Their mother also enjoys a high level of domination power, esp. in treating and controlling her daughters-in-law. This family also includes other members, such as unmarried or widowed daughters. (Below left: Hindu joint family; below right: Chinese joint family)

During the current economic development and modernization, the joint family is broken down somehow, esp. in the urban area. It is now replaced by new forms: nuclear family and extended family. We can clearly see the patterns of how large a family is from the chart below.



From table 1, we find that in China, nuclear families predominate in percentage, nearly reaching 50% of the total Chinese household. Other forms of families have significantly lower percentage, compared to nuclear family. In India, the curve is more flat, meaning more evenly distributed in family size. The size peaks in 4-person and 5-person household. 3-person family and below are significantly more rare than in China, while larger families are more common.

Shown in the survey, the average size of an ordinary family is 3.5 persons in China and 4.6 persons in India. For the Chinese, family size shrinks from 4.41 in 1982（中国社会科学院人口研究中心 1985）, to 3.96 in 1990（国家统计局人口和社会科技司 2001），and further down. Similarly, in India, joint family is not easily found in urban area. Apart from extended family and nuclear family, there emerge even smaller family forms, such as single-person family, double-income-no-kids family and single-parent family.

Overall speaking, families are getting smaller. Urban Chinese families are significantly smaller in size than rural households. In India, existing empirical studies have also claimed such differences, though Asia Barometer data does not provide us with information of Hindu rural/urban division.

Despite a general trend of shrinking family size, many studies have shown that family size is correlated with social class. Middle and upper-middle class family is largely smaller than family in lower social class, predominantly nuclear family. But Asia Barometer does not offer empirical support in Hindu and Chinese society. Based on the occupation information provided in the dataset, we could not identify those in the higher end of occupational prestige scale (e.g. owners, professionals, managers etc.) or those in the lower end (e.g. workers etc.). Hence we could not examine the pattern of family size and occupational prestige.

Apart from that, we still come across some interesting findings. For the difficulty in distinguishing social classes with available occupational information, we adopt different income group to proximate social classes, and further explore the relationship between family income level and family structure.





In Chart 2.1 and 2.2, some phenomenon catches our attention: in China, with no regard to the income level, three-generation household (light blue column in the chart) has a higher percentage than parent(s)-and-married-children-but-no-kids household (purple column in the chart); in India, it is to the contrary that three-generation households are much more rarely seen in all income level than the other type of household.

This seems to convey such a message: Chinese young couples tend to live separately from their parents before having a child, while after getting a baby, they tend to co-reside with the elder generation; in Hindu society, this trend is exactly the other way round. Young couples with no children tend to stay with their parents. Once they have children, they move out and live a separate life. In fact, with the birth of children, the family size increases. Staying with parents might reduce average living space and deteriorate life quality. It seems that moving-out is a reasonable choice. However, in China, young couples seem to go back to a traditional three-generation residential model after having child. This reveals a unique child-rearing pattern in contemporary China, particularly in the urban area. We shall elaborate on this issue in the "family function" part that, with a high female work participation rate and absence of professional child-rearing service provision, "grand-parenting" has become an important function in the temporarily extended family in urban China. Here, "temporarily" means that once the child grows up, elder couple and younger couple would again live separately.

Education also plays a role in shaping family size. We recode the respondents' education level to three categories: middle school or below, high school, and college/university or above. When the respondent reports his/her education level as college/university or above, the family size is significantly smaller than that of the respondent with lower education. And those with lowest education are living in the largest family as we can see from table 1. After controlling urban/rural division in China, this pattern still persists. It means that the effect of education level on family size is evident within urban and rural households respectively.

Table 1. Education level[2] and family Size (MLE)

	India	China
Education[a]		
Middle School or Below	0.4499***	0.3428***
	(0.1030)	*(0.0542)*
College/University or Above	-0.2009**	-0.1783**
	(0.0778)	*(0.0578)*
Cohort[b 3]		
Youth	0.1649*	0.0816
	(0.0774)	*(0.0538)*
Elderly	-0.2974**	-0.0846
	(0.1089)	*(0.0585)*
Gender[c]	0.1109	0.0326
	(0.0721)	*(0.0435)*
Urban/Rural(China)[d]		-0.4347***
		(0.0485)
Constant	4.5118***	3.7072***
	(0.0698)	*(0.0586)*
Observations	3101	4000
Adjusted R^2	0.013	0.058

Cell numbers are coefficients and standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

a. High school omitted b. Middle-age group omitted c. Female omitted d. Rural sample omitted

Part II. Family functions—what does a family do?

Family function is closely related to the family structure. On one hand, the family structure affects the family function: the bigger the family is, more complexity it confronts, and more functions it usually takes. On the other hand, a family will also structurally adjust itself to its functional needs.

Family structure normally designates positions, roles and norms of interaction for each family member. Different structures naturally bring about different sets of roles and norms. A rapid transition from traditional family prototypes to new forms would cause changes and tension in family structure and thus family function, as shown in China and India. Nevertheless, the core functions largely remain: a family shall always share resources and make a sustainable living, shall take responsibility to care for each other, esp. the youngsters, women, elderly and physically convenient (Silva & Smart 1999).

[2] There are three sets of items for education level in the dataset. To make the respondent's education level comparable, we recode the original items into a new categorical variable. For year 2003-2005, six categories are provided as 1 "no formal education", 2 "elementary school / junior high school / middle school", 3 "high school", 4 "high-school-level vocational-technical school", 5 "professional school / technical school", and 6 "university / graduate school". We recode 1/2 to 1 "Middle school or below", 3/4 to 2 "High school or equivalent", and 5/6 to 3 "College/ University or above".

For year 2007-2008, original 5-category coding are 1 "no formal education", 2 "elementary, school/junior high school/ middle school", 3 "high school", 4 "professional/technical school", and 5 "university/graduate school". We recode 1/ 2 to 1 "Middle school or below", 3/4 to 2 "High school or equivalent", and 5 to 3 "College/ University or above".

In 2006 wave Chinese data, the original coding are 1 "primary school or below", 2 "junior high school/middle school", 3 "high school/vocational school", 4 "college school", 5 "university", and 6 "graduate school or above". We recode 1/2 to 1 "Middle school or below", 3 to 2 "High school or equivalent", and 5/6 to 3 "College/ University or above".

3 We divide all the samples into three age cohorts: code 1 "youth", meaning 20 to 29 years old; code 2 "middle age", 30 to 50 years old; code 3 "elderly", 50 years old above.

These functions not only have economic implications, but also mean a great deal to the whole society.

Economic function. A family is foremost an economic unit that the members share their income and consumption. In India, there are words such as *hindi culha* (household), *vitu* (family house), *kutumpam* (family) which refer to such a unit. Similarly, in Chinese, *jiating* (家庭) conveys a message about the boundary of this unit（罗朗．拉蒂诺瓦 1998: 787-842）.

To sustain a family's living standard, at least some of the family members shall find a way to make a living. In India, the average number of bread-winner in one household is 1.5 persons; in China, this number is significantly higher, reaching 2.2 persons per household. Taking the family size of two countries into consideration, we see that the Hindu society has a fairly low labor participation rate, esp. for the elderly and the women.



From chart 3, we see that in Chinese non-single-person families, around 85% of the households have more than one family member in the labor market. In Hindu non-single-person families, this percentage is much lower, around 40%. More than 60% of the Indian households have only 1 person employed. Considering that India has larger family size, the labor/member ratio is significantly lower than its Chinese counterparts.

It is not against the common sense that, the more highly-educated women are more prone to take a job rather than being a homemaker, both in China and India, as shown in chart 4.1 and 4.2. A clear pattern is that with the rise of education level, female are more likely to be employed.





However, employment rate for women in Hindu society is largely much lower than in China, across different income groups and social classes. This low rate also drags down the overall employment rate in India. As we already see from chart 3 that more than 60% of the non-single-person households have only 1 bread-winner, while in China, it is common that couples both work till retirement.

This phenomenon has important implications for family's other functions, as we shall see later.

If the present main bread-winner cannot keep working for one reason or another, what are the alternatives to maintain the household budget? Hindu and Chinese families give different answers: after controlling social class, the Chinese are more likely to get support from their relatives and social welfare payments than the Indians; but the Indian would have a better chance of using insurance schema to cover this financially difficult situation, as we can read from the coefficients in the light green square in table 2.

And if we take further exploration to see what factors would affect people's choice of support system when confronting economic difficulty, we shall see that education level and social class have significant effect.

Table 2. Support system in two countries

	Relatives			Social Welfare			Insurance		
	Both	**India**	**China**	**Both**	**India**	**China**	**Both**	**India**	**China**
Class[a] [4]									
Owners	-0.1425	-0.3146	0.0383	-0.2012	0.6105*	-0.5939*	0.2477	0.1132	0.5246*
	(0.1497)	*(0.2089)*	*(0.2165)*	*(0.1880)*	*(0.3049)*	*(0.2534)*	*(0.1326)*	*(0.1592)*	*(0.2364)*
Middle class (Employed Managers	-0.4914**	-0.7725*	-0.3277	-0.1350	-0.0643	-0.1582	0.1940	0.0913	0.2742
& Specialists)	*(0.1673)*	*(0.3706)*	*(0.1915)*	*(0.1635)*	*(0.5550)*	*(0.1733)*	*(0.1427)*	*(0.2339)*	*(0.1867)*
Self-employed	0.2420*	0.3904	0.2394	-0.1694	1.2701***	-0.3726*	0.2778*	0.3523	0.3285
	(0.1149)	*(0.2557)*	*(0.1302)*	*(0.1371)*	*(0.3448)*	*(0.1472)*	*(0.1345)*	*(0.2255)*	*(0.1746)*
Family Structure[b]									
Single	-0.4381	-0.1367	-0.5993	0.0575	0.1527	0.0203	0.0476	-0.1424	0.2018
	(0.2528)	*(0.3962)*	*(0.3301)*	*(0.2441)*	*(0.6203)*	*(0.2671)*	*(0.2102)*	*(0.3085)*	*(0.2827)*
Extended & Joint	0.0350	0.0466	0.0158	0.1015	0.5220*	-0.0041	-0.0851	0.0077	-0.2399
	(0.0918)	*(0.1553)*	*(0.1141)*	*(0.1079)*	*(0.2371)*	*(0.1222)*	*(0.0940)*	*(0.1222)*	*(0.1506)*
Education[c]									
Middle School or Below	0.3432***	0.1475	0.3546**	-0.0357	-0.3778	0.0038	-0.4685***	-0.3663	-0.4767**
	(0.1019)	*(0.2488)*	*(0.1153)*	*(0.1172)*	*(0.4529)*	*(0.1235)*	*(0.1253)*	*(0.2186)*	*(0.1582)*
College/University or Above	-0.1449	0.0647	-0.3363*	-0.0606	0.0886	-0.1132	0.3698***	0.3588**	0.4015**
	(0.1097)	*(0.1571)*	*(0.1554)*	*(0.1270)*	*(0.2471)*	*(0.1490)*	*(0.0949)*	*(0.1203)*	*(0.1558)*
Country[d]	0.2571**			1.3995***			-1.0271***		
	(0.0964)			*(0.1322)*			*(0.0912)*		
Constant	-1.5697***	-1.5349***	-1.3349***	-2.7233***	-3.2681***	-1.2261***	-0.8667***	-0.8384***	-1.9524***
	(0.0963)	*(0.1263)*	*(0.1005)*	*(0.1365)*	*(0.2316)*	*(0.1001)*	*(0.0864)*	*(0.1027)*	*(0.1239)*
Observations	3804	1488	2316	3795	1484	2311	3804	1488	2311
Pseudo R^2	0.024	0.017	0.024	0.056	0.036	0.007	0.066	0.012	0.025

Cell numbers are coefficients and standard errors in parentheses $^{*}p<0.05$, $^{**}p<0.01$, $^{***}p<0.001$

a. Workers omitted b. Nuclear family omitted c. High school omitted d. India omitted

In table above[5], we finds that Indian middle class, compared to lower social classes (e.g. workers), are less likely to see support from relatives (exp(-.772)=.462). In the Chinese contexts, though we have not found statistically significant correlation between social classes and seeking support from relatives, education offers explanatory power: the higher education level the respondent has, the less likely s/he turns to relatives for help when facing financial difficulties. If we may assume multi-collinearity between education level and social class, then we come to a general conclusion that those with higher socio-economic status shall less use informal kinship networks to survive the economic difficulty as shown from the numbers in the red square in table 2.

The claiming use of insurance scheme shows divergence among groups with different education level in both countries (shown in the orange square in table 2): higher education level leads people to use self-purchased insurance. The use of commercial way shows an adverse pattern to the use of kinship ties, and both are related to the education

[4] Occupation is a categorical variable, including 18 items. The original coding are 1 "self-employed in agriculture, forestry or fisheries"; 2 "business owner in mining or manufacturing industry of an organization with up to 30 employees"; 3 "business owner of a retail organization with up to 30 employees"; 4 "vendor or street trader"; 5 "business owner or manager of an organization with over 30 employees"; 6 "self-employed professional"; 7 "senior manager"; 8 "employed professional or specialist"; 9 "clerical worker"; 10 "sales"; 11 "manual worker"; 12 "driver"; 13 "other worker"; 14 "homemaker"; 15 "student"; 16 "retired"; 17 "unemployed"; 18 "unemployed other".

We recode 2/3/5 to 1 "Owners", 2/8 to 2 "Employed managers and specialists", 1/4/6 to 3 "The self-employed", 9-13 to 4 "Workers", 14 to 5 "Homemakers", 17/18 to 6 "Other unemployed", 15/16 to 7 "Out of market". Here, we only display the coefficients and relevant standard error for 1-4 categories in the regression table.

[5] Table 2 only includes male respondents. Due to the extraordinarily high unemployment rate for Hindu women (85.87%), we might get biased results if we put male and female together to analyze the economic support system for a family.

level.

As to the support from social welfare system, we find more entertaining results: in India, those with higher socio-economic status (e.g. owners, self-employed small businessman) more often claim that they would use social welfare payments when confronting financial constraints, compared with workers; Chinese situation is to the contrary that higher classes are less likely to claim the use of social welfare payments (shown in the light blue squares in table 2). As we understand that Indian welfare system is no better compared to China, thus it seems to us that the Indian welfare system cannot offer adequate support to those lower class people. Poor people do not even think of relying on social welfare system. As Hindu researcher Bhangaokar (2010) has mentioned, the Hindu social welfare system is socialist in written documents, but capitalist in real practice. Though in principle, every neighborhood do provide social welfare scheme to those needy, but it is only accessible to a small fraction of people on the top of the social pyramid.

***Child-rearing function*.**

Previously we have mentioned that, in contemporary China, urban or rural, "grand-parenting" is already a common conduct. Child-rearing has always been an important part of family function, now and then, west and east. However, China depicts certain peculiarities that child care is largely provided by grandparents, remarkably different from Hindu pattern. This can be attributed to several causes.

Firstly, Chinese family has a unique power structure, in which the child lies in the center. This is related to the Family Planning Policy promulgated since 1978. The generation born after 1978 is usually the only child of their parents. In recent years, they start to enter their child-bearing period. Their children are very likely to be the 2-generation-only-born (两代单传). Thus it is quite natural for those children to become the focal point around which all the adults are centered. And the Indian extended family has a different power structure: the younger and elder generations are both assigned respective roles and norms in the family networks, the elderly being taken care of and having their own life.



The second cause might also have Chinese characteristics. Since 1949, the Chinese political power has consistently committed in promoting gender equality, both

ideologically and practically. This results in a fairly high female labor participation rate. Chart 5 reveals that 75% of the Hindu women stay outside the labor market as homemakers. In China, this percentage is much lower, 13% in total. This high ratio of female homemakers allows the Hindu women time for child-rearing on their own.



Actually, professional child-rearing service is lacking for both India and China. In China, a large percent of dual career couples (双职工) turns the parenting into grand-parenting. This makes no exception to the rural households: young adults immigrate to urban area to find a job, temporarily or permanently, leaving the elderly and kids behind in most of the year in the so-called "empty-nest". But in India, many women are not working in the labor market, thus young mothers can manage to take the responsibility of raising the child till school age.

However, if we consider India as a fairly young and energetic country with a huge stock of demographic dividend, meaning 60% of the population below 35 years old, this low rate of labor participation may start changing very soon. Actually, some new phenomenon has already emerged in urban area, such as leaving children to the professional or neighborhood-based day-care center. But largely grand-parents still do not get involved in the child-rearing very often, except for some value indoctrination during the childhood socialization. Mother-in-laws are powerful matriarch of the Hindu family, wielding direct or indirect manipulation, and daughter-in-laws generally abide by the role and norms assigned to her, including taking care of the child and the entire household.

In China, this important function of an extended family shall persist for many years until the public child-care service is in place.

Mutually-support function.

Though in India there is a dominantly high percentage of nuclear family, meaning that joint family is gradually breaking down, the "big family mentality" still persists.

Brothers and sisters now live separately with their own family, but psychologically they are still in a joint family, gathering very often, cooking and dining together, seeking advice and support from each other whenever confronting problems. Brothers-in-law

and sisters-in-law are all regarded as family members. Everyone has his/her role in this big family supporting network and shall act according to relevant norms.

A joint family is not narrowly defined by residential model. Physically separation does not necessarily mean mentally independence. Rather, if we look at the family function and mutual support among family members, we can clearly see that "joint family" is still there（罗兰．拉蒂诺瓦 1998: 395）.

In China, we find similar notion that young couple and their parents may live separately, but they mutually support each other. Shen (2010) finds that the urban young couples get frequent support, monetary and non-monetary, from both sides' lineage relatives, especially their parents. A popular token is that, an ideal living pattern for two generations are two doors and one bowl of soup, which means that parents and grown-up children shall live separately (behind two entrance doors), but not so faraway that newly-boiled soup is still warm delivered from one household's stove to the other's dining table. This description vividly shows that urban Chinese family is de facto a big extended family in terms of ties and support.

It is fair to say that, the Indians and Chinese are still closely knitted in larger families, though they might not "live" in it.

Part III. Family Values——what parents expect their children to be?

In this part, we shall explore the child-rearing values in two countries. We try to see if there is any gendered expectation from parents towards their children, respectively in China and India?

In the questionnaire, respondents are asked "How would you like to see your son(s) and your daughter(s) grow up? Of the following accomplishments, please select two that you would wish for a daughter and two that you would wish for a son ". And respondents are given a couple of items, from which they can select up to two items for each gender. Chart 6 below demonstrates the percentage of hits in each item, respectively for Chinese girl, Chinese boy, Hindu girl and Hindu boy.

We see from chart below that for girls, half of the Chinese parents want their daughters to, foremost important, find a good marriage partner; for sons, this expectation decreases to 15% with highest expectation on being more proficient than themselves, being very wealthy or being a great scholar. For Hindu parents, about 40% wish their daughters to find a good marriage partner, to become a person who cares about family and, surprisingly, to become a great scholar; most popular wishes for sons are to become a great scholar (57%) and a person who cares about family (33%).



We then combine the items of "become a great scholar", "become a powerful political leader", "become very wealthy", "become more proficient in profession than I am" to form a "pro-career" category; combine the items of "become a person who cares about the family" and "to find a good marriage partner" to form a "pro-family" category. We further define that, if respondents only choose item(s) from "pro-career" category, we can assume his/her expectation for children to be "a successful career"; if respondents only choose item(s) from "pro-family" category, we assume his/her expectation to be "a happy family"; if respondents choose one from each category, we assume his/her expectation to be "career-family both important". This three-category variable shall be used as the dependent variable of further regression analysis.

Independent variables include education level and standardized income[6].

In table 3, we find that after controlling respondent's gender and family's income level, there is no clear pattern in Chinese side. China's parents do not seem to show strongly gendered expectation towards sons and daughters. Only that the Chinese fathers tend to have stronger wish for their sons to have a successful career (see the number in the green square).

Hindu parents' expectation does not differ very much between sons and daughters either. However, the lower the education level, the less likely they wish their children to have a successful career, and more likely they emphasize the importance of a happy family. (See the numbers in red square)

[6] To see the procedure of standardizing income, please refer to the introductory part for detailed explanation.

Table 3. Expectation towards children in two countries

	Hindu Boy	Chinese Boy	Hindu Girl	Chinese Girl
Career-family both important				
Education[a]				
Middle School or Below	-0.5179**	-0.0250	-0.2603*	0.0049
	(0.1598)	*(0.1081)*	*(0.1196)*	*(0.0771)*
College/University or Above	0.0381	0.0033	0.1128	-0.1445
	(0.1332)	*(0.1329)*	*(0.0914)*	*(0.0916)*
Gender[b]	0.0020	0.1171	0.0552	-0.0481
	(0.1188)	*(0.0965)*	*(0.0839)*	*(0.0682)*
Income to size	0.0349	0.0313	-0.0040	0.0269
	(0.0201)	*(0.0219)*	*(0.0137)*	*(0.0154)*
Constant	0.8123***	0.6952***	-0.1299	-0.1494*
	(0.1040)	*(0.0898)*	*(0.0748)*	*(0.0634)*
Successful career				
Education				
Middle School or Below	-0.4251**	-0.1928	-0.5392***	0.0142
	(0.1436)	*(0.0989)*	*(0.1401)*	*(0.0820)*
College/University or Above	0.1052	0.1020	-0.1430	0.0358
	(0.1230)	*(0.1199)*	*(0.1037)*	*(0.0942)*
gender	0.1510	0.1966*	0.0006	0.0074
	(0.1092)	*(0.0880)*	*(0.0946)*	*(0.0717)*
Income to size	0.0227	0.0005	-0.0337*	0.0117
	(0.0186)	*(0.0197)*	*(0.0160)*	*(0.0158)*
Constant	1.3602***	1.4444***	-0.3938***	-0.3968***
	(0.0965)	*(0.0816)*	*(0.0820)*	*(0.0676)*
Observations	3101	4800	3101	4800
Pseudo R^2	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.001

Cell numbers are coefficients and standard errors in parentheses $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

a. High school omitted b. Female omitted

Further analysis and future study

As we could see from the above analysis, many changes have occurred to Hindu and Chinese family in structure, function and values. These changes may not be exclusively for these two societies, as researchers have shown that they can be found in many transitional societies as well（大卫．切尔 2005: 6-7）. The transitional society enjoys a rich legacy from the history, while confronting modernization at the same time. This brings about changes and tension, which is manifested in many facets, including the emergence of new family function, adjusted power structure, changing value system etc.

Though we have touched upon many phenomena in this paper, we have not satisfactorily offered a thorough theoretical explanation of commons or differences. We have to admit that western-based theory might not be able to fully explain what we see in China and India. Indigenous theory building is very important after synthesizing more empirical evidence and making more profound analysis. For instance, the "pseudo-nuclear family" in India and the grand-parenting in China both mean a great deal to the indigenous family study: functionally large family and strong family ties are the ways that local people respond to the wave of modernization.

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